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The United States - Japan Security relationship continues to exist in its present form because both
sides have become used to it, and are wary to let it die in the face of future uncertainties. Without a threat
of the proportions the Soviet Union once posed, Japanese and American officials are unable to find a
solid strategic foundation upon which to justify the current level of military integration.
Yet, the "Japan - United States Joint Declaration on Security" made by President Clinton and
Prime Minister Hashimoto in April 1996 talks about reaffirming and deepening these ties based on the
need to maintain regional stability. At the same time neither side is willing to outline what changes in
the current security environment are required to obviate the need for such a relationship.
The problems with deepening the level of security cooperation between the United States and
Japan are manifest. Even when a clear, common threat served as the basis for their coordinated efforts
during the Cold War, the Japanese did not view their security relationship with the United States as a
full fledged alliance. During that period, Japanese policy makers were careful to avoid any increased
military commitment, or foreign policy alignment with the United States that was not absolutely essential
to the maintenance of the relationship.
Now, both countries require more flexibility in dealing with other Asian countries than their
current bilateral relationship allows. In a multipolar world, both Japan and the United States must
individually decide how to defend their interests as they are challenged.
This thesis examines both the origins and current status of the United States - Japan security
relationship. It also appraises the relationships and conflicts of interests that both nations have with
other powers in the Asian arena.
The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to provide some insight into the making of the current and
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
If the architects of the first United States - Japan Security Treaty, Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru and John Foster Dulles, were still alive, they would be surprised and
disappointed to find that the security relationship has survived largely unchanged, and has
outlived the international political environment that led to its inception.
Both governments continue to emphasize the demands of the current security
environment in Asia as a rationale for maintaining the relationship in its present form. While
the United States and Japan certainly might find enough common ground to renegotiate and
sign a security treaty for 1996, neither side would agree to the basing of over 45,000 United
States troops in Japan given current threat levels. The American public would demand to
know the "exit strategy" - How long would the basing of troops last? What conditions in
Asia would allow for their withdrawal?
A newly created security relationship would undoubtedly be a more balanced
agreement that would give Japan more responsibility for it's own defense, and the
maintenance of regional security. United States presence would be limited to a few key naval
bases and air bases. The only United States ground forces in Japan would be, at most, a very
much smaller contingent of marines.
Both countries require more flexibility in dealing with other Asian countries than their
current bilateral relationship allows. Japan and the United States have different agendas and
methodologies in their dealings with Asia's main emerging power - China. Japan has
preferred to opt for cooperation and quiet diplomacy in its relationship with its large neighbor.
The United States and Japan also have differing policy priorities in their relations with other
Pacific Rim nations.
President Clinton's visit to Japan in April 1966 did nothing to fundamentally alter the
American-led security framework for Asia built during the height of the Cold War. Instead
the resulting "Joint Declaration on Security" called for deepening the United States-Japan
security relationship.
The problems with deepening the level of security cooperation between the United
States and Japan are manifest. Even when a clear, common threat served as the basis for their
coordinated efforts during the Cold War, the Japanese did not view their security relationship
with the United States as a full fledged alliance. During that period, Japanese policy makers
were careful to avoid any increased military commitment, or foreign policy alignment with the
United States that was not absolutely essential to the maintenance of the relationship.
Therefore, it was not until the early 1980s that any substantial combined United States - Japan
military exercises were conducted.
It is in American interests to reach a new agreement with Japan of the appropriate
relative roles of the two countries in dealing with regional and global concerns. Trying to
keep Japan in a geopolitically subordinate position by containing it via the existing U.S. -Japan
bilateral alliance will become a more questionable procedure as time goes by, and as Japan's
relative power grows. Before such a policy collapses under its own weight, it is more prudent
for the United States to seek a revised security relationship with Japan that is based on a more
realistic appraisal of their relationship in the new international security environment of the
region.
IfJapan decides that it prefers to use "check-book diplomacy" rather than dispatching
its troops in a given situation, then it should be left to do so. Conversely, United States policy
makers must remember that they have a duty to choose their fights carefully. Being tied to
commitments that do not clearly affect vital interests is a luxury that America cannot afford.
They also should remember that moral crusades to remake other countries into America's
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A. THE CHANGING NATURE OF SECURITY
Since the end ofthe Cold War, many American political leaders and security analysts
have conducted zero-based reviews of the country's national security requirements, and the
policies that have been recommended to achieve those new goals. While there have been
disagreements over the implications of trends that are reshaping the international political
environment, most agree that the primacy of military power has waned, and the relative
importance of national economic vitality has gained new emphasis among the world's great
powers. Furthermore, transnational problems like pollution, immigration, and terrorism have
challenged the capacity of individual nation-states to protect their own interests without the
help of the international organizations, and international cooperation.
Since the Treaty ofWestphalia, nation-states have been responsible to their citizenry
for providing military security. During the Cold War, both communist and democratic
governments discharged this responsibility to an unprecedented degree. The magnitude of
national treasure allocated to military efforts by democratic nations not involved in a hot war
was without parallel. As the Soviets and Americans were engaged in what they perceived to
be a zero-sum struggle, the threat of a nuclear war that promised to destroy all of human
civilization hung over the nations of the earth. At times, regional military conflicts seemed
like they were pushing the two superpowers to just such a precipice. The gravity of the
possibilities brought on by this bipolar struggle forced the two superpowers, in particular, and
their allies (to a lesser but still profound degree) to subordinate other national objectives like
improving infrastructure, and promoting a more prosperous civil society. Relative inattention
to socioeconomic security needs has left the states of the former USSR and the United
States facing many of the same types of ills — if on a different scale. Both are plagued by
high crime rates, drug and alcohol abuse, serious government debt, and deteriorating
infrastructure.
Another characteristic of the by-gone Cold War was the stridency and importance
given to the ideologies driving the two camps. The successful strategy of containment was
based on its own set of beliefs that contained dogmatic elements. While it served to unify
allied efforts to confront the threat of Soviet expansionism, the belief in containment strategy
sometimes made American leaders purblind to other, more promising policy options.
America's failure in Vietnam caused its people to question not only the dogma that inspired
their side during the struggle of the Cold War, it also caused a more fundamental
reexamination of American values. From an international political perspective, the most
important outcome of the Vietnam War was its impact on American willingness to become
involved in armed conflict. Some 20 years after the fall of Saigon, American presidents still
have to demonstrate to the American people that they are not about to become involved in
military adventures that resemble Vietnam "quagmires." American reluctance to send troops
to Bosnia is a current example of this lingering unease caused by their failure in Vietnam.
The death of communism as an ideology and strategy designed to further the
socioeconomic development of mankind is complete. Communist China and North Korea
only cling to the superstructure ofthe communist state in order to preserve domestic political
stability. Those people who devoted their careers to the defense and promotion of
communism's discredited creed also possess a melancholy disenchantment with ideological
imperatives. Instead, citizens ofthe former Soviet Union focus on improving their day-to-day
existence, and mainland Chinese are caught up in the frenetic drive to take part in an historic
economic boom.
In short, ideological extremes are passe in most parts of the world (even radical
Islamic movements in the Middle East have been sobered by the Arab-Israeli peace process,
and the failures ofthe Iranian Revolution). However, as has been clearly demonstrated in the
former Yugoslavia, Russia, and parts of Africa, nationalism and ethnic conflict have
reemerged after years of being sidelined by coercive power. In Northeast Asia, nationalism
has found its expression in the more nuanced, and mature requests of Japan to be given a seat
on the Security Council, Chinese demands that foreigners stop meddling in their internal
affairs, and Korean efforts to erase the architectural reminders of their colonial past.
Another phenomenon that has fundamentally changed the calculations of national
security requirements in the new international system has been the spectacular rise of the so-
called newly industrialized economies (NIEs) — particularly the "Asian Tigers" who were
inspired by the Japanese model of economic growth. Ironically the very success of the NIEs
was made possible by the Bretton Woods system, and the promotion of free trade by the
United States as part of a strategy to bolster its allies in the struggle against communism.
From 1965 to 1990, eight high-performing Asian economies — Hong Kong, the
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand —
experienced remarkable economic growth, and substantially improved living standards. High
rates of investment exceeding 20 percent of GDP on average between 1960 and 1990,
including in particular unusually high rates of private investment, combined with rising
endowments ofhuman capital due to universal primary and secondary education, are factors
that explain a large part of their rapid growth. [Ref. 1] Their state-supported export push
strategy, coupled with government intervention designed to target certain industries,
encourage applied research, and public savings are also cited as the causes of the economic
miracle. [Ref. 2] Whether the success of sound macroeconomic policies, or the importance
of government intervention in the marketplace is the critical policy lesson that today's nations
take away form this historical experience is uncertain. However, governments throughout
the world have undoubtedly become more sensitive to their role as protectors, and promoters
of their nation's economic security.
The success of the Asian NTEs has also been dependent on their ability to acquire
foreign technology, and use it to increase the productivity of their manufacturing industries.
Over the last thirty years the diffusion oftechnology, and the ability of nation-states to acquire
and control new technologies have been critical factors in determining their relative economic
strength. [Ref. 1 :p. 1961] These trends seem to be accelerating as the major powers compete
to control not only the technologies that will insure a military edge, but those that will help
them capture new markets.
Numerous articles have sought to explain the erosion of America's technological
superiority over the past few decades. Many analysts conclude that America has inhibited its
own technological advance by overemphasizing the need for more advanced defense
technologies, rather than providing the requisite encouragement of private investment in
civilian technologies. [Ref. 3] Some authors cite the failure of the United States to make the
proper investments in basic scientific education, and in other areas of civil society that would
provide the appropriate climate for technological development. However, it is clear that the
mere development of a new technology is not enough, private industry must be able to apply
advances in technology in commercial processes for it to improve living standards, and
increase the relative economic power of a particular nation.
As a result of the rapid advances made possible by the exploitation of technological
developments, the main players on the international stage will not discount the impact that
technology can have on their national security.
B. THE LIKELY NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT
Some authors have asserted that armed conflict between nations has become more
unlikely as economic interdependence grows, and as the potential benefits of military
adventures decline. They argue that, compared to alternative policies designed to achieve
certain national objectives, the option of using military force has become far less viable than
it has ever been before. [Ref. 4]
Others write about the promises of "democratic peace." They see the proliferation
of liberal-democratic institutions in nations throughout the world following the end of the
Cold War as a trend that will ultimately produce peace among nations.
These optimistic views have intellectual roots that go back to the late nineteenth
century (and the late seventeenth/nineteenth century — Immanuel Kant was a proponent of
democratic peace theory). Many English and French believed that intellectual and commercial
progress helped to counter some of the misunderstanding and grievances that had led to
earlier wars. The so-called "Manchester school" of international relations believed that since
nation were growing richer through international commerce rather than conquest,
governments would choose to defend their interests with rational discussion rather than
threats. In their view:
The fortress ofpeace were those institutions and inventions which promoted
the exchange ofideas and commodities: parliaments international conferences,
the popular press, compulsory education, the public reading room, the penny
postage stamp, railways, submarine telegraphs, three-funneled ocean liners,
and the Manchester cotton exchange. [Ref 5]
1. Democracy and Peace
In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton declared that "ultimately the
best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of
democracy everywhere." [Ref. 6] His administration has continued to express the belief that
democracies do not fight each other. The idea that democratic nations do not go to war with
each other is based on the belief that the values of liberalism promote foreign policies that
prevent war. Specifically, the liberal commitment to individual freedom, the pursuit of
material well-being, and happiness give rise to foreign policies and governmental institutions
that work together to produce democratic peace. It is not that the power politics of realism
do not matter to liberals, but that they see it as part ofa larger picture of international politics.
[Ref. 7] When the possibility of war between two states that view each other as liberal-
democracies arises, liberal elites in both countries will agitate against war and the electorates
of those countries will force their governments to steer the conflict off of a trajectory that
leads to war.
The worrisome aspect of this hypothesis, particularly for relations among Asian-
Pacific countries, many of which are nascent democracies, is that there is the possibility that
two potential combatants will not view each other as being of the liberal-democratic tradition.
The corollary to the idea that democracies do not fight each other is that democracies are
more likely to be goaded into war with states they believe to be illiberal. Since definitions of
what constitutes a democratic government are likely to be different for Asians, who have
traditionally emphasized the importance of the group over the individual, and family or group
loyalties over responsibilities to the nation, the effects of the mechanisms that are supposed
to produce democratic peace between nations may not work. (Indeed, many western political
analysts view Japan's democratic institutions as a facade for what is really a bureaucratic-
authoritarian government). [Ref. 8]
Christopher Layne argues that the current infatuation with the prospects for
democratic peace represents the triumph of wishful thinking over observable reality. From
his point ofview, there is no evidence that a world full of democratic states would negate the
structural effects of the anarchy at work in the international system. Nor does economic
interdependence prevent conflict. He thinks that basing national security strategy on a neo-
Wilsonian ideology of democratic peace is dangerous for two fundamental reasons:
If democracies are peaceful but non-democratic states are "trouble-makers"
the conclusion is inescapable: the former will be truly secure only when the
latter have been transformed into democracies too. [Ref. 9] Liberal theory of
international politics defines out of existence (except with respect to non-
democracies) the very phenomena that are at the core of strategy: war, the
formation of power balances, and concerns about the relative distribution of
power among great powers. [Ref. 9]
So democratic nations that base their foreign policy on notions of democratic peace
run the risk of intervening militarily where their real interests are not engaged and failing to
protect vital concerns where they are challenged by other liberal-democratic governments.
2. Multilpolarity and War
Some international relations theorists have supported the idea that war has lost much
of its utility as an instrument of national policy because of the new multipolarity in
international politics. They argue that a multipolar system allows a greater number of
interactions among a variety of states, and therefore the danger of two states becoming so
focused on a certain, war-provoking bilateral struggle is diminished. Similarly, multipolarity
should discourage dangerous arms races between two rival nations since they will not have
to match each other's arms acquisitions in equal increments. Instead, the relative military
power ofloose coalitions will be the critical factor. [Ref. 10] There will be a disincentive for
a particular nation to embark on a massive arms build-up since this will provoke other nations
into forming a balancing coalition against that nation.
Other international relations theorists argue that since multipolarity increases the
number and significance of interactions between nations, it increases the likelihood of conflicts
of interest. Furthermore, since it is more difficult to estimate the systemic effects of a conflict
between two players in a multipolar world than it is in a bipolar one, there is greater
uncertainty— less stability— in a multipolar system. It is precisely this uncertainty that may
lead nations to make miscalculations about their potential to succeed in securing their national
goals through war.
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of future armed conflict based solely on the
multipolar models of international relations theory. However, one can make broad
assessments about the future character of international conflict by taking into account the
apparent trends at work in the latter half of the twentieth century in conjunction with the
aspects of multipolarity that seem to fit those trends. Admittedly this kind of endeavor is
based more on art than science, but it still offers practical estimates that can be the foundation
for sound policies.
C. FUTURE WARS
Armed conflict among major powers is highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. The
lethality of weapons of mass destruction, and the obvious stake that the major powers have
in the maintenance of the international trade and financial systems are strong arguments for
preserving the status quo among them. For the same reasons, the likelihood that small wars
will escalate into major conflagrations due to great power intervention is remote.
Civil war will remain the dominant form of violence in today's world. The sort of
conflict that has taken place in the former Yugoslavia, and in the states of the former Soviet
Union characterizes the kind of localized and vicious warfare that the world is most likely to
see in the coming years. These conflicts will end in some sort of settlement, or in the eventual
preponderance of one side over the other. Despite the notoriety and horror produced by
these struggles, they will have little impact on the distribution of power in the international
system.
Wars of military aggression designed to capture (or recapture) foreign territory will
be a rare phenomena occurring only in the remote areas of the world between relatively
inconsequential nation-states. Most states, including all the major powers, will continue to
believe that they stand to gain more by trading with other countries than by fighting them.
[Ref. 11]
Regional conflicts may produce temporary economic or political disruption for players
with substantial interests there, but the likelihood that such wars will produce systemic
catastrophe for the international system is very low. The reactions of the major powers to
these conflicts will most likely be benign neglect or offers to provide mediation and peace-
keeping forces. The military response of the major players so often elicited in response to
regional conflicts during the Cold War will rarely take place.
D. AMERICA AND ITS ASIAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS
On April 18, 1996, the father of the containment strategy, George Kennan, was
interviewed during a broadcast of the "News hour with Jim Lehrer." Looking back over the
10
years following World War n, Kennan lamented some ofthe grand mistakes the United States
had made in its security policy choices. [Ref. 12] He explained that his proposal to contain
Soviet expansionism was misunderstood by United States leaders. He felt that a political
containment versus a military containment of the Soviet Union was the appropriate response
to threats to American interests. While the military containment of Soviet hegmonism in
Europe was successful, he believed that the United States could have accomplished more in
Asia with a policy of political and diplomatic engagement with the Soviet Union. The Korean
War could have been avoided, and the Vietnam War was unnecessary. (No one would listen
to John Davies when he described Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist who would use, rather than
be used, by the forces of world communism).
Now that containment strategy is no longer the governing principle behind United
States security policy in Asia, America's security relationships need to be redefined in the
context oftoday's threats. First, both America and its Cold War partners need to ensure that
their current security relationships are reformed so that each nation will be able to defend their
particular interests, and avoid being drawn into disputes that don't affect those interests.
Secondly, since multilateral cooperation is required to solve the most intractable threats to
United States security - such as weapons proliferation, pollution, economic conflict, etc. -
America must avoid forming bilateral relationships that preclude substantial multilateral
cooperation. In other words, it is not in America's interest to categorize Asian countries into
lists of friends and foes until such an eventuality exists.
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H. THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES - JAPAN SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP
A. THE SECURITY TREATIES
In analyzing the origins and current utility of the U.S.- Japan security relationship, one
must always bear in mind the historical context in which the first Mutual Security Treaty was
signed.
At the end ofWorld War II, Japan was a wasteland denuded of its former industrial
might and burdened with a malnourished population that had been drained by years of futile
warfare. Its occupation, ostensibly run by the representative of Allied Forces, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was essentially an American affair that was intent
on leaving its imprint on nearly all aspects of Japanese society and governance. The
Occupation, administered by General MacArthur, in fact had a mandate to drastically alter
Japanese society in fulfillment of the broad guidelines enumerated in the Potsdam Declaration
of July 26, 1945.
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be
permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and
productive lives.
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or
destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals,
including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech,
religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights
shall be established. [Ref 13]
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The Potsdam declaration also stipulated that those Japanese leaders who had
"deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest" were to be
stripped of all authority. Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru felt that these purges
coupled with the other reforms initiated by the Occupation authorities were excessive, and
went much further than expected. In discussing General Courtney Whitney's (the officer in
charge of implementing the purges) tersely written account of the purges, Yoshida explains
his memories ofthose events: If the purging from public life of tens of thousands of Japanese
is in fact an unpleasant memory for those responsible, it is equally so with us... It was
understandable therefore that the SCAP directive of January 4, 1 946, which committed so
many leading figures in the nation to banishment from public life, came as a major shock to
us. [Ref. 14]
The shocks of a crushing defeat, nearly two decades of military domination, and the
policies of a reform-minded Occupation authority left Japan a politically and intellectually
confused nation during the years immediately following World War II. Though the objectives
of the Occupation authorities were sometimes inscrutable to the Japanese, they were
passionate in their support for policies that would preclude Japan's involvement in future
wars. [Ref. 15] What was uncertain in the late 1940s was the form of security guarantees that
would be put into place to ensure the future safety of a disarmed Japan.
The nature of any future security regime designed to protect Japan from external
threats hinged on the terms of the peace treaty that would be imposed upon Japan. Some of
the members ofthe Allied Council advocated a punitive peace intended to hobble rather than
14
reform Japan. [Ref. 16] Initially, American sentiments were also divided about the terms of
peace to be put before Japan. At one end of the spectrum in United States policy making
circles was the so-called "China Crowd" who advocated a punitive peace designed to stunt
Japan's recovery. They recommended a complete dismantlement of Japan's Emperor system,
as well as the zaibatsu system of industrial production. [Ref. 16] The "Japan Crowd," lead
by former Ambassador Joseph Grew, were more intent on preserving the Imperial institution
as a kind of adhesive that could hold the defeated nation together, and bolster it against the
threat of Soviet intervention. [Ref. 16: p. 15]
As the United States and the Soviet Union began quarreling over the shape of the
post-war world, it became clear that the newly born United Nations would not be the
guarantor of peace as was planned. Furthermore, it became more apparent that Japan would
not be able to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement with all of its wartime adversaries.
National Security Council (NSC) Directive 13/2, issued in 1948, recognized the threat
that Soviet expansionism posed to Japan, and recommended policies that would reverse some
of the reforms undertaken by the Occupation. [Ref. 18] Under NSC 13/2 emphasis was to
be placed on ensuring Japan's economic recovery and political stability, rather than purging
militarism from their culture. [Ref. 18]
During the early years of the Occupation, Prime Minister Yoshida anticipated a
post-war security arrangement that would make Japan permanently neutral and demilitarized
(what MacArthur had described as an Asian version of Switzerland). [Ref. 19] Under these
15
arrangements Japan would need the promises of the Soviet Union, as well as the United
States, and other great powers that its neutrality would be respected.
On June 28, 1947, Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi (from Prime Minister Katayama
Tetsu's Cabinet) delivered what came to be known as the "Ashida Memorandum" to General
MacArthur's diplomatic advisor George Atcheson and to General Whitney. The
Memorandum stated that the Japanese government preferred to enter into a special agreement
with the United States against external agression by a third power; and at the same time to
build up its domestic police forces on the ground and on the sea [Ref. 20]. Japanese leaders
from the Liberal Party, the Democratic Party, and parts of the Socialist Party realized that the
Soviet-American split would mean that Japan would have to pick one or the other
superpower as a guarantor of its security. They would not be able to depend on the UN and
its ability to carry out its duties as set forth in the Charter.
Given the make-up of the Occupation forces, the superiority ofAmerican air and naval
power, and the historic and persistent geostrategic rivalry between Japan and Russia, there
was little debate (with the exception of some idealogues) about which camp Japan should
pick.
However, at the time the Americans were not ready for the Ashida proposal. General
Whitney rejected the memorandum, thinking that such proposals were still premature. [Ref.
21] Ambassador Atcheson was killed in a plane crash while en route Washington, DC, and
as a result the copy of the memorandum that he was carrying did not reach the policy makers
in the capital. Ashida continued to seek United States acceptance of his plan, and in
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September of 1947, the War Department let it be known through unofficial channels that the
United States was not ready to conclude separate peace treaties with Germany or Japan. [Ref.
22]
However, the events of the developing Cold War gradually convinced reluctant
American diplomats that a comprehensive peace treaty with Japan that would include the
Soviet Union, and a newly established Communist regime in China were hopeless. General
MacArthur began to press for an early and separate peace treaty with Japan that would end
the Occupation. Shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War he issued a memorandum
that spelled out his position:
The Japanese people have faithfully fulfilled the obligations they assumed
under the instruments of surrender and have every moral and legal right to the
restoration of peace...We should proceed to call a peace conference at once.
[Ref. 16: p. 254]
The outbreak of the Korean War led the Americans to overrule some of the Allies'
calls for a punitive peace with Japan. Negotiations over the terms of the peace treaty began
in earnest during the winter of 1950, and concluded with a signing ceremony at the San
Francisco Peace Conference. The peace "conference" was held to approve a treaty that had
been already completed by Dulles through bilateral diplomacy.
The first Security Treaty between Japan and the United States was signed in 1951.
Signed on the same day as the Peace Treaty (September 8) during a simple ceremony held at
the Presidio in San Francisco, the treaty was a short document containing a preamble and five
articles. The text that had been under negotiation for eight months in Tokyo was released to
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the press just two hours before the signing ceremony. [Ref 16: pp. 280-281] It was the
result of very intense, and, at times, unpleasant bargaining between two very important,
protagonistic shapers of the United States - Japan security relationship. The positions taken,
and measures recommended by Prime Minister Yoshida, and Ambassador John Foster Dulles
set the tone and provided a persistent outline for the still ongoing debate between the United
States and Japan regarding bilateral security issues.
From the beginning of negotiations Dulles insisted that Japan must bear the burden
of maintaining a force capable of defending against a possible Soviet invasion. (According
to Nishimura Kumao, who was the chief ofthe Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, Dulles
wanted Japan to build a force that include 350,000 ground troops). [Ref. 22: p. 59]
The touchstone of Ambassador Dulles' position, to which he repeatedly made
reference, was the Vandenburg Resolution, passed by the Senate in June, 1948, as the basis
for United States participation in NATO. That resolution stated that the United States would
associate with such "regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous
and effective self-help and mutual aid." He warned that the Senate would not ratify the
security treaty unless it met the requirements of this resolution, and he insisted that
"continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" meant military self-help and military
action. [Ref. 22: p.60]
Yoshida opposed substantial Japanese rearmament on two grounds. He pointed out
the political danger he faced in going against the spirit of Article IX of the new, U.S. -imposed
Japanese Constitution which declared that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
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potential will never be maintained." [Ref. 23] The war-weary Japanese public would have
replaced any prime minister who embarked on such a build-up at that time. Secondly, and
more fundamentally, Yoshida held Japan was simply incapable of rearming at that point for
economic reasons. The preamble of the first U.S.- Japan Security Treaty acknowledged
America's willingness, for the time being, to station its armed forces in Japan only in the
expectation that
Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against
direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armaments which could
be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in
accordance with the purposes of the U.N. Charter. (See Appendix B for full
text.)
At Dulles' insistence, Article I also included provisions that made it possible for United
States forces to be used to quell internal riots instigated by "outside Powers" [Ref. 24]. The
treaty did not include explicit United States promises to come to the aid of Japan if it were
attacked Yoshida had to settle for the American argument that if Japan were invaded they
could not remain neutral as long as United States troops were stationed there. [Ref. 14: p.
267] In other words he had achieved only a de facto United States commitment to defend
Japan.
In general, the treaty reflected Japan's subordinate relationship. In many ways it
amounted to a continuation of the Occupation. Some Japanese viewed the document as being
one-sided because it provided the United States with the Asian bases it needed in its struggle
against Soviet expansionism without giving the Japanese any clear American guarantees to
protect their security.
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As Japan grew more economically independent during the latter half of the 1950s, its
public became more sensitive to the latitude the treaty gave to American forces in Japan.
There was a strong public sentiment behind a revision of the treaty. Negotiations for the
revision of the Japan - United States Security Treaty began in 1957 at the request of Prime
Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aichiro proposed to the United States
that any revised treaty should include the following changes:
1
.
Make explicit commitments for the United States to defend Japan.
2. Confine Japan's obligations to the limits of the Japanese Constitution.
3. Establish a prior consultation system concerning the the deployment and
operation of United States forces in Japan.
4. Set a clear term of validity (10 to 15 years) for the treaty, after which the treaty
could be terminated by either party (Article IV of the original Security Treaty
specified that termination of that treaty required the approval of both
governments. [Ref. 25]
The revised treaty that was eventually signed in Washington on January 1 9, 1 960,
addressed many of the grievances the Japanese had with the old "unequal treaty." The new
title (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security) reflected the kind of equal status sought
by Ashida and Yoshida years before. (See Appendix C)
However, negotiations over the treaty sparked some of the most heated
demonstrations Japan has seen in the post-war period. The issue raised by the opposition
parties were generally centered on the question of the need for such a treaty during a period
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of lessening tensions in the Cold War. Some Japanese called for the immediate abolition of
the security treaty, and the adoption ofunarmed neutrality.
The specific concerns of those Japanese opposed to the new treaty had to do with
possible implications of Article VI:
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance
of international peace and security in the Far East the United States of
America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and
areas in Japan.
They worried that the "Far East" clause would force Japan to follow United States strategy
in the Far East and could involve Japan in a war waged by the United States. [Ref 25]
The debate in Japan over the treaty turned into a debate over the rules of
parliamentary democracy, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) railroaded the treaty
through the Diet, with only a LDP-controlled House ofRepresentatives vote conducted. This
tactic caused Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke to be driven out of office. His successor, Prime
Minister Ikeda Hayato, returned the focus of the country to economics rather than politics
when he kicked off his "income doubling" program.
Japanese foreign policy goals set by Ashida, and modified by Yoshida continued to
serve as a foundation for Japanese security into the 1990s. The central pillar for both Ashida
and Yoshida's national security objectives was the formation of a defensive security
relationship with the United States Yoshida, however, placed greater emphasis on
establishing Japan's economic independence than on generating a national defensive capability.
He was committed to a lightly armed military force that would not appear threatening to
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Japan's neighbors, despite United States demands that Japan provide for an increasing share
of its defense.
The course that Yoshida set for Japan's security policy proved remarkably successful
for later generations of Japanese leaders. With the nation's focus placed squarely on
economic revival Japanese GNP grew twenty fold from 1950 ($10 billion) to 1970 ($200
billion). [Ref. 26] The opposition parties that had advocated unarmed neutrality and other
Utopian policy options lost popularity over the years. The Mutual Security Treaty proved to
be a reliable deterrent to foreign aggression, and kept Japan from being directly involved in
any foreign war to protect its interests.
Furthermore, by spending just enough on defense to appease United States policy
makers, but not enough to build the forces required to obviate the need for stationing United
States conventional forces in Japan, Japanese were able to effect a sort of containment on
possible United States military adventures. That is to say, while the United States did gain
critically important bases as a result of its treaty with Japan, Japan's meager defenses
threatened United States policy makers with the possibility of strategic overreach if the United
States became deeply involved in conflicts elsewhere.
B. END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE ONSET OF ECONOMIC RIVALRY
From the very beginning of the Cold War, the United States was committed to the
rebuilding ofJapan and the expansion of its economic strength. President Eisenhower urged
United States companies to share technology with Japanese firms and to buy their products.
American leadership saw an economically healthy Japan as a source of stability and strength
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for the region. The validity of this belief had been proven by the contribution of Japanese
industry to America's logistical needs during the Korean War. (The Japanese economy was
kick-started by the United States demand for war material, and other supplies).
Trade between the two countries grew rapidly. The Japanese adoption of an export-
push strategy administered by a corps of elite, dedicated bureaucrats at the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) eventually led to Japan's dominance of markets once
controlled by American firms. [Ref 27] As the Japanese conquered mature industries such
as textiles, steel, and automobiles, American producers began to call for protestion from their
imports.
Americans who had been accustomed to selling more to the Japanese than they bought
found the roles reversed in 1965. Ever since then the Japanese have maintained a trade
surplus with the United States Japan trade surplus in merchandise grew from $2.5 billion in
1975 to nearly $60 billion in 1993. Both economists and even some politicians in America
acknowledge that the trade relationship is based in part on the structural realities of an
international system that requires Japan to maintain trade surpluses with countries like the
United States so that it can afford to maintain trade deficits with that supply its oil and
lumber. However, many Americans believe that its trade deficit is caused by Japan's unfair
trading practices.
At any rate, the dispute between the United States and Japan over trade has been and
continues to be the cause of serious friction between the two countries.
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In 1970, the negotiations over voluntary quotas for the United States import of
Japanese textiles collapsed, and marked the first time in the postwar period when the two
countries had publicly failed to agree on a substantial issue [Ref 28: p. 374]. It really was
the first time that Japan said "no" to the United States.
The United States government efforts to stem the tide of certain imports from Japan
along with attempts to open Japanese markets to American goods continued through the
1980s. None of these measures changed the fundamental nature of the trade relationship, and
some have even strengthened the international competitiveness of Japanese firms. A bilateral
agreement (negotiated during the Reagan Administration's tenure) on the voluntary restraint
of the export of Japanese cars to the United States actually enabled Toyota and Nissan to
penetrate new car markets.
The collapse ofthe Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, and the measures taken
by the Nixon Administration to protect a faltering American economy gave further evidence
of the shift in the U.S.- Japan economic relationship. The inflationary policies of the Johnson
Administration, and an unwillingness by Japan (and Germany) to revalue their currencies, as
they continued to pursue export-led growth, undermined the foundation of the Bretton
Woods system — the convertibility of dollars into gold. [Ref. 29] In August 1971, Nixon
unilaterally suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, and imposed a temporary
surcharge on imports. The Japanese dubbed these this event as the "second Nixon shock"
(the first shock being his decision to reopen relations with Communist China earlier that
summer). These economic measures were both meant to staunch the flow of Japanese-made
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imports into the United States However, these efforts did not prevent the Japanese from
running a record four billion dollar trade surplus with the United States in 1972. [Ref. 15: p.
367]
Japan's new found economic strength, and the bitter trade disputes between the United
States and Japan caused Americans to ask why Japan was not spending more for its own
defense. For decades Japan has spent around one percent of its GNP on defense while the
United States has consistently spent between five and seven percent of its GNP on the military
since the 1970s.
The Nixon Doctrine announced in Guam in 1969 was, in a sense, and echo of Dulles'
call for America's allies to bear an increasing share of the costs for their own defense. With
America heavily engaged in the Vietnam War, Nixon sought to transfer some of America's
burden to Japan: "We shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility for their own defense." [Ref. 30]
During the late 1970s the Soviets began an alarming build up of their forces in Asia.
Following the conclusion of a treaty of friendship with Vietnam the Soviets moved naval and
air forces into Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. They also fortified their bases in the disputed
Kuril Islands. These events coupled with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and their threats to
employ the Breshnev Doctrine to quell the Solidarity movement in Poland led the United
States to reinvigorate its containment policy. Along with drastic increases in United States
defense spending, the Reagan administration called on its allies, Japan in particular, to
strengthen their own defenses and improve military-to-military cooperation efforts with the
25
United States In 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki made a commitment to defend Japan's southern
sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles. While this was a very important commitment from a
political perspective, in practical military terms Japan still lacked the ability to carry out such
a promise.
Suzuki's successor, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, a former Defense Agency
Chief and Imperial Navy officer, was intent on increasing Japan's own defense capability, and
its share of the burden of maintaining United States forces in Japan. Despite his sincere
efforts to lift the psychological ceiling on Japan's defense spending it remained in the
neighborhood of one percent of GNP.
In summary, despite consistent goading (or foreign pressure [gaiatsu] from Japan's
perspective) by the United States to increase their defense spending the Japanese government
opted for incremental improvements of its armed forces instead of substantial rearmament.
The Yoshida Doctrine produced economic success which in turn led to United States
trade disputes. Japan's increasing capacity but continued unwillingness to pay for more of its
own defense in conjunction with its reluctance to give any ground on trade issues earned it
the label of "free-rider." Even though Japan did respond to United States pressure in the late
1970s by starting the "Host Nation Support" program (in which it paid an increasing share
of the costs required to base United States troops in Japan) and by increasing the
interoperability of United States and Japanese forces under the 1978 U.S. -Japan Guidelines
for Defense Cooperation, many Americans viewed these efforts as being insufficient.
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C. FROM FREE-RIDER TO ECONOMIC RIVAL
Towards the end ofthe 1980s, as Japanese companies began to capture large market
shares of high technology goods like semiconductors (what Clyde Prestowitz called the
"crude oil of the 21st century"), Americans in and out of government began to see Japan as
an economic adversary that threatened the United States national security. When the
Japanese electronics company Fujitsu submitted a takeover bid for Fairchild Semiconductor,
Secretary ofDefense Weinberger and executives from the American defense industry voiced
their concern. Norman Augustine who was chairman of Martin Marietta said:
Leadership in commercial volume production is being lost by the United
States semiconductor industry. United States defense will soon depend on
foreign sources for state of the art technology in semiconductors. This is an
unacceptable situation. [Ref. 3 1 ]
Pat Choate's 1990 book, Agents ofInfluence outlined Japan's penetration of American
society, and its ability to control important political and economic levers in the United States
by using its financial clout. Choate chronicled the extensive lobbying effort in the United
States conducted by the Japanese government, and Japanese conglomerates. [Ref. 32] The
high-profile purchases of American property, and a substantial increase in Japan's direct
investment in the United States (before Japan's "bubble economy" burst) seemed to support
Choate's contentions, and warnings.
As Gorbachev's perestroika produced a less menacing Soviet Union, the apparent
threat from Japan's economic and technological advances received more attention from
American leaders. Without the clear-cut threat of Soviet expansionism there was little
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rationale for continuing to subordinate economic issues between the United States and Japan
to military concerns. The end of the Cold War only seemed to underscore the renewed
emphasis on the importance of economic competitiveness and the diminishing relevance of
military power calculations.
During the Iran-Iraq War, American and NATO warships provided protection to
Kuwaiti-flagged tankers (including many Japanese hulls); as a result, the flow of crucial oil
supplies from the Persian Gulf was maintained. The absence of Japan's warships from
Operation Earnest Will, despite Japan's overwhelming dependence on oil from the Gulf, led
many nations to question Japan's role in the international community. The parameters of the
Mutual Security Treaty that were set to counter a Soviet threat seemed increasingly out of
context.
The greatest blow to the relevance of the U.S.- Japan security relationship since the
end ofthe Cold War was brought about by Japan's hesitance to participate in or support the
U.S. -led coalition in the Gulf War. During the war, Americans concluded from Japan's
reluctant contributions that the Japanese were not sincere allies who shared the same level of
commitment to the maintenance of international peace and order. When the Japanese
government did finally come through with a substantial financial contribution to the coalition
forces, it simply reinforced the American perception that the Japanese thought that they could
continue to buy their way out of international problems, and avoid spilling their own blood
to defend their vital interests.
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Early in the conflict the Bush Administration had warned Japan about Congressional
anger over Japan's perceived free-ride and small role in the Gulf crisis. The Administration
also presented the Japanese with five demands:
1
.
Directly contribute to the defense ofthe Persian gulf region through the dispatch
of personnel and equipment, including minesweepers and transport planes;
2. Provide monetary support for the multinational forces;
3 Provide aid to neighboring countries in the region affected by the crisis;
4. Reveal plans for buying major weapons systems from the United States; and
5. Increase financial support for stationing United States troops in Japan. [Ref 33
:
p. 309]
The initial response ofthe Japanese government (a $1 billion package) was judged by
the Americans to be incommensurate with Japan's economic status. United States
Ambassador Armacost warned Japan that its contribution to the crisis would have an effect
on its bid for a U.N. Security Council seat; and the Congress made threats to begin
withdrawing United States troops from Japan [Ref 33: p. 3 10].
Ironically, Japan's eventual contributions to the GulfWar effort was a substantial $13
billion package, along with a precedent-setting deployment of Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) minesweepers to the Gulf after hostilities had ended. Unfortunately, it
appeared to be too little and too late from the international community's perspective. What
was remembered by the Americans was Japan's insular reaction to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait as some Japanese described it as "a fire on the other side of the river."
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Following the GulfWar, excerpts from the book The Japan That Can Sav "No" ("No
to Ieru Nihon) written by Diet member Ishihara Shintaro, and Sony chairman Morita Akio,
made their way into the American press. Ishihara urged Japanese leaders to recognize the
leverage that Japan could exert on the United States through its control of certain high
technology commodities (e.g., computer chips). He denounced Japan's acquiescence to
American demands during the Gulf War. The coverage of this Japanese point of view in the
American press reinforced United States perceptions of Japan as a economic adversary A
report commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the latter part of 1990,
Japan: 2000 . asserted that
Mainstream Japanese, the vast majority of whom absolutely embrace the
national visions for world economic domination... are creatures of an ageless,
amoral, manipulative and controlling culture — not to be emulated —suited
only to this race, in this place. [Ref. 34]
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HI. THE UNITED STATES IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLICY AT THE END OF
THE COLD WAR
The United States - Japan military alliance continues to exist mostly because both
sides have become used to it, an are wary to let it die in the face of future uncertainties.
Without the threat of the proportions the Soviet Union once posed, Japanese and American
officials are unable to find a solid strategic foundation upon which to justify the current level
of military integration. Collective defense requires a clear, common threat to organize
against.
It has been very difficult for the Japanese and American militaries to agree on the
focus ofnew combined operations plans to replace the old "Operations Plan 5051" in which
provisions are made for the defense of Japan in the event of a Soviet attack. Consequently,
it has been equally difficult to generate realistic scenarios for combined United States - Japan
military exercises.
The staff of Commander Naval Forces Japan, and the staff of the Commander of
Japan's Self Defense Fleet take turns hosting an informal discussion group made up of
representatives from various JMSDF and USN commands. A general topic is chosen and
naval officers ranging in rank from lieutenant to captain spend a couple of hours discussing
it. At one of these meetings in the Spring of 1993, the USN's new "From the Sea"
warfighting strategy was discussed. (This new doctrine shifted the USN's focus from fighting
a blue-water Soviet navy in a war-at-sea to plans for fighting wars in the world's littoral
region against brown-water navies.) The Japanese officers present at this particular
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discussion could not see how their navy would be integrated into this new United States
do.trine. Some of the discussants came to the conclusion that the Mutual Security Treaty
would have to be revised in order to continue meaningful cooperation between the two
navies.
A poll conducted by the Chicago-based Council on Foreign Relations in the Spring
of 1995 found that more than two-thirds of Americans want their government to remain
deeply engaged abroad, but are increasingly unwilling to pay the human or financial costs of
doing so. [Ref 35] The Republican-controlled Congress has picked up on this mood in
American public, and has submitted budget legislation that could reduce spending on foreign
affairs by a quarter. Americans spent trillions of dollars fighting the Cold War, and relish the
leadership role forged during those years, but they do not want to maintain that role at any
cost. In reevaluating United States policies in the post-Cold War period, the security
relationship with Japan will come under increasing scrutiny since it involves America's defense
of an economic superpower.
Anthony Lake has described those Americans who would cut the resources necessary
to sustain the U.S.'s current commitments abroad as neo-isolationists who are willing to
forfeit America's leadership in the international arena. [Ref. 36] However, if one takes a look
at developing conditions in East Asia it is apparent that the United States is already becoming
more of a partner rather than a leader in international politics, and economics there.
Furthermore, many of the intra-regional disputes in Asia do not engage America's vital
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interests directly. The U.S.'s current alignment in East Asia is a legacy of Cold War
imperatives, and should be modified to reflect new realities.
Instead the Clinton-Hashimoto summit in April 1996 underscored the importance of
maintaining America's current alignment in the region given "the prevailing security
environment." The Joint Declaration on Security issued after the summit did not spell out the
types of changes in East Asian security that would allow for realignment.
One result ofthe summit is a source of concern for some of Japan's neighbors, as well
as some security analysts in both countries. The Joint Declaration calls on both countries to
promote bilateral policy coordination in dealing with "situations that may emerge in areas
surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of
Japan [Ref 37] China wonders if this will mean American involvement in Sino-Japanese
disputes. Some Japanese and Americans worry about being drawn into conflicts that do not
affect their respective national interests.
The two countries also signed a bilateral "acquisition and cross-servicing agreement"
in April 1996. Though this will allow Japan to provide fuel and parts for American forces
engaged in UN peacekeeping operations, it really answers American needs for logistical
support identified in contingency planning conducted during the Cold War years (America has
sought such an agreement for nearly a decade).
There is no doubt about the importance of a cooperative security relationship between
the United States and Japan, but that is not the same thing as saying the present alliance
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structure should be maintained. Th total contribution that the two countries can make to
global peace and prosperity must be maximized.
A. THE CHINA FACTOR
Whatever course the United States - Japan security relationship takes will have a
direct effect on China's strategic calculations. Conversely, whether an increasingly powerful
China chooses to cooperate in the maintenance of the international status quo or it seeks to
establish dominance in the region will be an important factor in determining the future levels
of United States - Japan security cooperation.
Therefore, United States leaders must have a clear appreciation of China's current
foreign policy goals, and the degree to which these goals conflict with American interests
before any decision to modify the United States - Japan security relationship is made.
1. China's Influence
China's geography and growing economic clout give it a vital stake in virtually all of
East Asia's conflicts of interest. Its ancient civilization and culture have deeply influenced its
neighbors, and have provided the basis for communication, and common understanding.
China's cooperation is required to solve Northeast Asia's most intractable and
dangerous security issue, the easing of tensions between North and South Korea. China's
territorial claims in the South China Sea must be sufficiently accommodated in order to avoid
the ever present danger of military conflict there.
The substantial and growing level of economic integration between China and other
nations of the Asia-Pacific make China's continued economic health and political stability a
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critical factor in determining the future economic vitality of the region. It is for these reasons
that both the leaders ofthe region's governments, as well as the world's financial markets are
intensely interested in the outcome of any leadership succession struggles that may place after
Deng Xiaoping's death.
Finally, China's position in the world, and its seat on the U.N. Security Council give
it an important say in issues that are far beyond the geographical confines of its own region.
Without China's acquiescence the United States would never have been able to get a
legitimizing seal of approval from the Security Council to mount a multilateral military
coalition in the GulfWar. The solution to concerns like the control of weapons proliferation,
and the prevention of arms races requires China's active support as both a major producer and
purchaser of modern armaments.
Based on considerations such as the ones listed above, President Clinton decided to
abandon the linking of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to China's performance
on human rights. Anthony Lake explained this change in policy in the spring of 1994:
Certainly issues like Korea, issues that come up at the U.N., the China vote
and veto at the U.N. — all of these things reinforce the importance of our
having a positive, constructive relationship with China. [Ref 38]
2. China's Interests in the New World Order
At this moment in history the Chinese view the external security environment of the
region as a relatively benign one. The threat from their most dangerous neighbor subsided
as Gorbachev removed the "three obstacles" to better relations with China listed by Deng
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Xiaoping in 1982 ( massive Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnamese expansionism in Indochina). [Ref 39]
Through continuing confidence-building measures between the two countries military conflict
on the Sino-Russian border seems increasingly remote. The fact that smuggling and illegal
immigration are the major border control concerns of the two neighbors is indicative of the
drastic change that has taken place in Sino-Russian relations.
The official recognition of South Korea by China in 1993 was an important landmark
in the removal of another Cold War vestige in the region. Having a window on both the
South' s politics, as well as the hermetic North Korean governments, has given China the
opportunity to more effectively influence events on the peninsula. China has continued to
favor a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. As a result it supported the North-South
agreement in 1992 for a non-nuclear peninsula. According to former Foreign Minister Han
Sun-Joo, it was China's willingness to cooperate with the South Korea and to pressure North
Korea that precipitated the October 1994 Framework Agreement between the United States
and North Korea. [Ref. 40]
Historically, Chinese governments have not tolerated an unfriendly power in control
of the Korean peninsula. China's struggle with Japan, and Russia over this objective in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Mao's decision to go to war with a superpower
in order to drive it from the Yalu River demonstrate China's determination on this point.
Anticipating the eventual political and economic absorption of the North by South Korea the
Chinese have already established strong economic and political ties with Seoul. The Chinese
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see the continued presence of United States troops on the Korean peninsula as another Cold
War vestige that serves as a brake on the reunification process. [Ref. 41]
Sino-Japanese relations are decidedly upbeat. The visits of the Emperor, and former
Prime Minister Hosokawa to China, along with the contrition they expressed regarding
Japanese militarism during the Pacific War helped to soothe China's concerns about Japan's
future intentions. Japan's willingness to avoid serious confrontation over the Senkaku (Diao
Yu) Islands, and Sino-Japanese maritime borders in the East China Sea are also in line with
China's current desires. The July 1996 incident in which a right wing group called the
Japanese Youth Federation erected a makeshift lighthouse on Uozuri-jima in the Senkakus
illustrates the point. While the Chinese press vehemently criticized the activities of such
Japanese groups and called on Tokyo to restrain them, Beijing also prohibited its citizens
from demonstrating against the Japanese government. It was content to allow Hong Kong
and Taiwanese residents to carry out the at-sea protests in the name of Chinese interests. The
Japanese response was also muted with the Maritime Safety Agency actually performing a
rescue at sea of one of the Chinese demonstrators.
When Japanese fishing vessels and merchantmen transiting the East China Sea began
experiencing armed attacks by semi-official pirates operating from the Chinese mainland,
Japan chose quiet diplomacy vice increased military presence to seek a solution to the
problem.
Japan's demonstrated commitment to the peaceful resolution of Sino-Japanese
disputes in conjunctions with its preference to avoid involvement in what China considers its
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"internal affairs" (e.g., human rights issues) have served to strengthen their bilateral relations.
Japan's recent refusal to grant a visa to Taiwan's President Lee Tung-hui shows its reluctance
to go against Beijing's "one China policy," and contrasts sharply with the shifts in America's
Taiwan policy. The Chinese have rewarded Japan's attention to diplomatic form, and its
effort to preserve China's face in the international arena. In return for such Japanese
consideration, China has allowed Japanese oil firms to conduct drilling operations in the
disputed waters of the East China Sea and Beijing has tolerated the flights of Taiwanese
airlines between Osaka and Taipei.
Conversely, China's worst fears about the degree to which America was willing to
intervene in its dispsute with Taiwan were realized in March 1996 when the mainland
conducted military exercises and ballistic missile firing near the island. The dispatch of two
aircraft carriers (the USS Nimitz never actually was in striking distance at the area) to the
region buoyed the mood ofvoters in Taiwan, and probably shocked leaders in Beijing. It also
made the United States' policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding the Taiwan issue far less
ambiguous.
China's main concern regarding Japan are the future possibilities of a substantially
rearmed Self Defense Force, and the political rhetoric of rightist politicians who deny
Japanese atrocities during the Pacific War, and see Japan's wartime "Co-Prosperity Sphere"
as an effort to liberate Asia from Western colonialism. While many Chinese admit that there
are strong anti-military sentiments among the Japanese people, they believe that Japanese
schools have failed to teach its people about the horrors visited upon Asians by the Imperial
38
Army. This, they think, has caused the Japanese to misunderstand the real concerns of their
Asian neighbors about the possible remilitarization of Japan. The Chinese blame American
Occupation officials for the failure to fully expose to the Japanese public some of the more
heinous crimes committed by the Imperial Army during the war — such as the biochemical
experiments conducted by "Unit 731." The Chinese also blame America's demands that Japan
bear a greater share of its own defense burdens on what they perceive as a substantial
improvement in Japan's military capabilities over the last twenty years.
Up until the last few years the Chinese welcomed the continued presence of American
forces in Japan as a check on Japanese militarism. These days Chinese strategists wonder if
current circumstances warrant the stationing ofUnited States forces in Japan, especially if the
United States continues to pressure the Japanese into purchasing sophisticated weaponry.
Another more fundamental reason that the Chinese are less comfortable with a
continued American military presence in Japan is that they believe that with the Soviet threat
gone the United States - Japan alliance is directed against them. The fact that one of the
carrier battlegroups that deployed to the east of Taiwan during the elections there in March
1996 sortied from Yokosuka, Japan, demonstrates that American forces in Japan are
potentially threatening. They cite the United States' East Asian Security Initiative fEASD of
1992, and the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region of 1995 as
evidence of America's inability to completely overcome Cold War thinking. [Ref. 41] EASI
announced America's commitment to the security of its "friends and allies," but glosses over
the need to promote the prosperity and stability of other nations in the region. The 1995
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document still puts China in a category other than "friends and allies." Furthermore, some
Chinese scholars believe that the United States government and the American media are
circulating propaganda about what they call the myth of the Chinese military threat in order
to scare China's neighbors into cooperating with United States policies. The "China threat
myth," they maintain is not just intended to give a future rationale for the United States -
Japan Security Treaty, but is also designed for the consumption of Southeast Asians.
China has made great efforts to improve its relations with the nations of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the last five years. It has attended
ASEAN's Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) as a guest, and it welcomes the multilateral
security discussions of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, it has been China's
aggressive stance on its claims to the Spratly (Nansha) Islands in the South China Sea that has
given Vietnam, and its ASEAN neighbors cause for concern. The People's Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) sank two Vietnamese vessels in the area in 1988, and there have been
numerous incidents in the South China Sea between the two countries since then. Most
recently the Philippines and China have exchanged threats over the Chinese occupation of
reefs near Palawan Island.
The Chinese maintain that their actions in the South China Sea do not represent any
hegemonic aims, but stem from long, and previously undisputed, historical claims to the
islands. In 1992 at the Fourteenth Party Conference the Chinese enacted a "Maritime
Territories Law" that spelled out their claims to these disputed territories. The Chinese have
called for joint research, and possibly joint development of the area but prefer to avoid any
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immediate multilateral effort to determine the ownership of the islands. They are determined
to eventually gain control of all the islands and reefs in the Spratlys, but they are content to
wait until a more opportune time.
Chinese interests and influence in Indochina are profound and growing. Without
China's cooperation the progress made in repairing Cambodia's tattered society would have
been impossible. Chinese arms sales to Thailand, and its military assistance to Burma have
strengthened its ties to these strategically located countries. Thailand's decision to refuse to
allow the stationing of United States prepositioning ships (loaded with war material) in the
Gulf of Thailand was made partially because it wanted to avoid offending Chinese
sensibilities.
The numerous, and politically powerful overseas Chinese who live in Southeast Asia
are another source of political leverage, and financial capital for Beijing. They provide
economic and cultural links to the region that can be used by China to compete with Japanese
economic penetration there.
In general, China has its own agenda when it comes to international affairs. Its
greatest concern about any "new world order" is that it will be one that the United States tries
to dominate. China insists it is committed to the peaceful resolution of international disputes,
but, at the same time, refuses to be bullied by outside forces on issues that affect its
sovereignty. It believes that any new world order must be based on the U.N. Charter, and the




Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Nonaggression;
3 Noninterference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit;
5. Peaceful coexistence. [Ref 42]
The Chinese support the idea that nation states should be allowed to choose the social
system and the path to national development that they prefer.
3. China's Internal Matters and United States Interests
Since President Nixon and Mao Zedong began normalizing U.S.- China relations in
1972, the most persistent impediment to good relations has been the dispute over what China
considers to be internal issues.
China's treatment of its own people has become a domestic political issue in America
with many Congressional leaders, and members of the Clinton Administration advocating a
harder line towards the Chinese government regarding the issue. As a presidential candidate,
Clinton had bashed President Bush for coddling the "butchers of Beijing." He vowed to take
a tougher stance towards the aging autocrats. The Chinese leadership did not believe the new
president was prepared to revoke the PRC's MFN status over the human rights issue (an
action viewed by many Asians as the trade equivalent of dropping an atomic bomb that would
produce collateral economic casualties in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United
States). Just as the Chinese leaders estimated, American business interests, and international
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pressure forced the Administration to back down from its principled stand on human rights
without any face-saving concessions from the Chinese.
Recently one ofthe oldest, and most fundamental causes of Sino-American troubles,
the nature ofUnited States - Taiwan relations, has resurfaced and is threatening to sour other
aspects of the United States - PRC relationship. Bowing to Congressional pressure in the run
up to an election year, Clinton sanctioned the unofficial visit of Taiwanese President Lee to
his American alma mater, Cornell University. China reacted with bitter criticism of this policy
reversal. It launched a blitz of negative commentary concerning other United States foreign
policy initiatives ranging from human rights to the Mideast peace process. [Ref 43] China
also canceled its defense minister's scheduled visit to the United States; and is probably
waiting for an even more important issue that is vital to America's interests to demonstrate
the consequences of going against China's Taiwan policy. [Ref. 44]
In response to the show of force by the United States Navy in March 1996, China's
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that "Taiwan is a part of China and not a protectorate of
the United States." [Ref. 45] The leadership in Beijing believes that it could have already
peacefully resolved the issue of reunification with Taiwan had it not been for persistent
meddling by the United States.
The three joint communiques (the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the December
1978 joint communique on normalization, and the 1982 joint communique on weapon's sales
to Taiwan) that are the very foundation of United States - China relations each address the
acceptable levels of United States - Taiwan relations. The Chinese believe that Lee Teng-
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Hui's visit to the United States, and President Bush's decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan, and the
dispatch of aircraft carriers near Taiwan last March, were clear violations of the spirit and
letter of these agreements. The PRC's policy of deepening Taiwan's diplomatic isolation is
intended as a means of speeding up the reunification of the island with the mainland. Beijing
continues to react jealously to any initiatives by Taiwan or other countries that it perceives
are contrary to this overarching political goal.
However, the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in March has served as a warning to leaders
on both sides of the issue. A military conflict over Taiwan is clearly in no one's interests.
While the Chinese harbor resentment for the reaction by the United States they have
subsequently welcomed high level visits by national security advisor, Anthony Lake, the
commander of the United States Forces in the Pacific, and following the presidential
elections, the secretary of state.
4. Weapons and Technology Proliferation
Beijing's sale of missiles and nuclear technology to countries in the world's most
volatile areas continues to be a major national security concern to America. The sales of
intermediate range ballistic missiles (CSS-2) to Saudi Arabia in 1988 was viewed by the
United States as a highly destabilizing development in Arab-Israeli relations. The sale of a
large number of surface-to-surface missiles to Iran (including Silkworm anti-ship missiles) was
also inimical to American interests in the Persian Gulf because of the danger it posed to oil
tankers and United States Navy ships. China has provided nuclear technology to Iran, Iraq,
Pakistan, and Brazil among others.
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The Chinese are motivated to sell arms, and to transfer dangerous technologies for
various reasons that include strategic, political, and economic considerations: China believes
that these sales and transfers are no more destabilizing than those of the United States or
other more active arms traders. It views this activity as China's sovereign right, and as a
means to enhance its international prestige [Ref 46].
China has been supportive of weapons control regimes like the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [Ref. 47] However,
its continued testing of nuclear weapons still poses a problem for the United States because
ofthe influence this activity has on the ambitions of some states that want to join the nuclear
weapons club.
A significant breakthrough for Sino-American relations regarding missile and nuclear
material proliferation came during Vice Premier Qian Qichen's visit to Washington in October
1994. After two days of ground-breaking talks between Chinese officials and the
Administration, they reached two separate agreements aimed at curbing the proliferation of
missile technology, and controlling the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
[Ref. 48] China accepted, for the first time, a definition that satisfied America as to what
constitutes a violation ofthe Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). [Ref. 49] China
declared that it would not export surface-to-surface missiles "inherently capable" of reaching
a range of300 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms. [Ref. 49] This agreement solved
a dispute with America concerning China's shipment ofMl 1 missiles ("Hatf ' is the Pakistani
name) to Pakistan in 1993.
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The agreement to control the production of fissile material was made in order to
underline Chinese and American support for the NPT. Some people interpreted this
development as a Sino-American message aimed at the leader ofNorth Korea. China clearly
wanted North Korea to be more accommodating in its negotiations with the United States
over the future of its nuclear program.
Some analysts attributed this shift in China's missile sales policy to the improved
military-to-military ties between the two countries. The exchange of visitors from the
Department ofDefense and China's Ministry ofDefense (MOD) that began in the Fall of 1993
allowed Secretary Perry to explain United States concerns about such technology transfers.
The MOD's desires to improve military-to-military ties, and to encourage United States
cooperation on other issues led to the Chinese government's new position on the issue.
As has been demonstrated in the past, the United States will have a very limited ability
to unilaterally stop the flow of Chinese arms, and technology. A continued emphasis on the
strengthening of international agreements on proliferation, along with extensive bilateral
negotiations on the subject are the only ways that the United States can influence Chinese
policy.
5. China's Internal Dynamics
The uncertainty offuture Chinese military developments along with the possibility of
political instability in China are grave concerns for Japanese and American security analysts
The Chinese are in the midst of Sidefacto transfer of power from the old guard to Deng's
designated successors. While Deng still clings to life, Jiang Zemin is attempting to
46
consolidate his power base in the party and the military. Jiang seems to be committed to
carrying out the pragmatic ("if it works, do it") economic policies of his predecessor. He is
also intent on continuing the Communist Party's monopoly of political power.
Still, the Chinese face enormous socio-economic pressures that will challenge the
ability of any Chinese government to handle. Feeding a growing population that is already
about 22 percent of the world's population using only 7 percent of the globe's arable land will
produce extreme environmental, and social stresses. [Ref. 50] The mass migration of
hundreds of millions of displaced farm workers to metropolitan areas will be another source
of political instability. The unemployment, and underemployment problems will continue to
grow as the government breaks the "iron rice bowl" provided by state firms. Add to this the
infusion of political ideas and information (the "flies and mosquitoes" that leaders had
expected) from the West that come into China along with increased trade, and one gets a
sketch of the dangers faced by Party leaders in Beijing.
These developments have the potential to sour Sino-American relations as they did
after the Tienanmen massacre in 1989. The Chinese government blamed the events in
Tienanmen Square on the United States policy of "peaceful evolution" (effecting a change in
the Chinese government through the corrosive influence ofWestern thought), and more direct
attempts to subvert the Chinese government. Many Chinese leaders believe that the United
States is actively pursuing these goals.
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Therefore, the potential exists that the Communist leadership may focus the blame of
future domestic political disorder on the United States This, of course, could result in a more
reactionary Chinese posture vis-a-vis the West.
6. Conclusion
From 1969 until the early 1980s, the United States and China entered into a strategic
alignment against the Soviet Union. This period was characterized both by phases of
excitement over the new ties, and occasional mistrust about the actual intentions of the other
side. Harry Harding described it as "a marriage of convenience rather than an enthusiastic
romance" in which each side worried about being entrapped or abandoned in the three-way,
strategic struggle with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 39: p. 297]
In 1996, the geostrategic stakes at risk are not as great, but the prosperity and
continued progress ofthe region depend on significant cooperation, and mutual understanding
between the two powers. Both nations stand to benefit from international regimes that limit
weapons of mass destruction. United States and Chinese citizens can only benefit from
expanded bilateral trade. Neither country stands to benefit from the military conflict that
might result ifTaiwan declares its independence. Similarly, while the United States does not
take a position on China's claims to maritime territories in the East China Sea, and South
China Sea, military hostilities in these areas threaten sea lanes that are vital to both countries
economically.
The Clinton-Hashimoto summit was interpreted by China as further evidence of a
American containment strategy vis-a-vis China. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said the
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following in response to the United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: "If their
security alliance is being expanded to cover areas surrounding Japan, it could raise a big
problem." [Ref. 51]
Since the United States will depend on China's cooperation to solve many of the
transnational problems that affect both countries' interests, such as arms control, drug traffic,
Aids, refugees, and pollution, it is imperative that they remain engaged politically, militarily,
economically, and culturally.
Treating China as a potential adversary may produce such a reality. Putting China in
a category other than "friends and allies" creates an artificial fault line in East Asia. [Ref. 52]
The Chinese have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate when the United States has
opted to pursue engaging and quiet diplomacy, and when the United States does not attempt
to meddle in what it perceives as its internal affairs.
B. THE KOREA FACTOR
In the words of Prime Minister Lee Hong-Koo, Korea is at the vortex of Northeast
Asia with an overpopulated China, an extremely wealthy Japan, and a geographically
enormous Russia as neighbors. [Ref 53] As a result, Korean diplomacy must be tactful and
masterful in order to guarantee its own interests while accomodating those of its powerful
neighbors. However, South Korean leaders believe they face the most favorable conditions
since the end of the Korean War for the resolution of the issue of reunification with North
Korea, as well as other regional security issues that affect them.
49
Prime Minister Lee, and former Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo believe there are
unmistakable trends at work in the region and throughout the world that support the
reconciliation of former Cold War enemies, international cooperation, and openness. South
Korea's restoration ofnormal diplomatic relations with its erstwhile enemies China (in 1992)
and Russia (in 1990) are major accomplishments on the road to peace and stability on the
peninsula.
South Korean leaders think that North Korean elites are well informed about the
economic and military conditions in the South. The North Korean military leaders are under
no illusions about the likely outcome ofwar on the peninsula, despite their aggresive rhetoric.
Han Sung-Joo believes that the North continues its war-like declarations, and the large
deployment of its troops near the DMZ in order to assure the continued presence of American
troops in South Korea. [Ref. 40] According to him, the North believes that the presence of
United States troops acts as a brake on the ambitions of South Korean generals who might
decide to reunify the country by force.
For these reasons, the South Korean leadership thinks that a war brought on by a
sudden attack from the North is unlikely. However, the massive deployment ofNorth Korean
troops, artillery, and rockets directly threaten Seoul, and are taken seriously.
Some believe that Kim Il-Sung had lost confidence in his son's leadership and was
seeking to put North Korea in a more favorable position before he died. In June 1994, Kim
Il-Sung invited former President Carter to Pyongyang in order to end the dispute over the
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) inspections of the North's nuclear facilities.
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Prime Minister Lee believes that this was a brilliant move by Kim that allowed North Korea
to save face, and protect its interests.
The Framework Agreement on North Korea's nuclear program signed between the
United States and North Korea in October 1994 is seen by South Korea as just another part
of the process that will lead to reunification — not just an attempt to solve the problems
posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Those Koreans who support the
Framework Agreement contend that it will help to produce the "soft-landing" scenario
(peaceful and gradual) for unification that they predict. Han Sung-Joo believes that the North
will eventually accept the terms of the agreement (including a reactor designed and built by
South Korea) even if it continues to threaten, and bargain in order to gain further economic
or political benefits. Implementing the agreement will force substantial contact between
North and South Korea when thousands of South Korean workers go to work in the North,
and when the Northerners go to the South for training. This in turn will produce the
meaningful North-South dialogue that South Korea has been trying to attain.
Drastically improved economic and political relations with its Chinese and Russian
neighbors, and the continued, spasmodic progress made on the Framework Agreement have
gone a long way in erasing the legacies of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula.
What Koreans have more difficulty in overcoming are the more ancient antipathies
they feel towards the Japanese. The Japanese invasions ofKorea in the sixteenth century, and
its colonial occupation of the peninsula during the first half of this century left Korea
physically, and psychologically scarred. While Korea has flattered the Japanese by emulating
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their economic growth strategies, Koreans of all generations are bitterly resentful of the
Japanese colonial legacy.
After fourteen years of strained negotiations, South Korea and Japan normalized
relations in 1965. The normalization treaty cleared the way for extensive trade relations that
caused Japan to surpass the United States as South Korea's number one trading partner. By
the early 1990s, bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded $30 billion. [Ref. 54]
However, the treaty did not achieve an emotional reconciliation between the two people
Most Koreans continue to feel that Japan has not sincerely shown remorse for its treatment
of Koreans during the colonial period. In the last few years, the issue of Korean "comfort
women" who had been forced by Imperial Japan to service its troops provided an example of
the kind of unfinished business that has to be concluded.
The attempts by Japanese leaders like Prime Minister Tanaka to reestablish diplomatic
ties with North Korea have been viewed with suspicion, and resentment by South Koreans.
In spite of the 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique that linked Japan's security to that of
South Korea, many South Koreans believe that Japan still prefers a divided Korea. Even
though Japan will provide financing in support of the Framework Agreement, South Koreans
were startled, and anxious by Japan's decision to hold direct talks with North Korea in April
1995 when the North was refusing to accept South Korean reactors. [Ref. 55]
1. Globalization of Korea
Because the South Koreans are focused on the future, and their place in the
international system, its leaders have called on them to overcome the emotionalism of the
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past. President Kim Young-Sam's "globalization" program advocates an opening up of Korea
to the global economy; and to expand the depths of its contacts with the major powers —
including Japan.
President Kim views the revolutionary changes at work in world politics and
economics as a challenge that must be faced by Korea:
About 100 years ago, we faced a similar global tide of change. At that time
Korea failed to cope with it and, in consequence, lost its sovereignty and
suffered humiliation and hardships for decades. Korea should have promptly
opened itself and vigorously pursued industrialization in order to build a
modern nation as quickly as possible. [Ref 56]
Korea continues to need infusions ofJapanese technology, and investment to compete
in a borderless global economy. Korean acknowledgment of the interdependence of the
region's economies promotes a future-oriented relationship with Japan. President Kim's
globalization program also indicates the fundamental changes that have taken place in the
U.S.-South Korea relationship. With respect to the security relationship, Korea is gradually
assuming a leading role in its own defense with the United States playing a supportive role.
The South is no longer content being a military client of a superpower now that the Cold
War is over.
Since it joined the U.N. as a full member in 1991, South Korea has actively
participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). The first South Korean PKO forces
(the "Evergreen Unit") to be sent abroad went to Somalia in July 1993. The dispatch of the
Evergreen Unit was seen by the Koreans as a turning point in their national history. Besides
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being a source of increased pride and prestige, it marked the transformation of South Korea
from a beneficiary ofU.N. help to being a donor. [Ref. 57: p. 136] Following the dispatch of
PKO forces to Somalia, South Korea has sent a medical unit to the Western Sahara, military
observers to Georgia, and the Indo-Pakistani border, and has also notified the U.N. of its
capability to participate in Standby Arrangements.
South Korea's Defense Minister Rhee Byoung-Tae visited Japan and Russia in the
Spring of 1994 in an effort to promote military friendship and security cooperation with its
neighbors. The meeting between the Japanese and Korean defense ministers produced
agreements to expand military personnel exchanges, exchange visits of cadet training ships,
and enact procedures that would prevent military airplane accidents. [Ref. 57: p. 133]
Koreans see these changes in military roles as a natural consequence of the
transformation of the international order. Its attempts to conduct increased military-to-
military exchanges, and cooperation are part of the government's foreign policy initiatives for
the implementation of globalization, diversification, and cooperation.
2. The United States Role on the Peninsula
The Republic of Korea - United States security cooperation relationship has been
focused on deterring a militarily aggressive North Korea during the last forty years. Despite
the end of the Cold War, and improved relations with China, and Russia, South Korean
leaders think that a United States military presence in the country for the near term is
desirable as the South navigates through the uncertainties of the new international
environment. However, in the longer term, as South Korea prepares to reunify with the
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North (through absorption or confederation) it will undoubtedly want to loosen direct military
ties with the United States.
The South Korean people are becoming less tolerant of the stationing of over 35,000
United States troops on their soil. Yongsan, the sprawling United States base complex in
crowded downtown Seoul, is a constant reminder of the opportunity costs borne by the
Koreans in order to maintain United States military presence. Many Koreans are unhappy
with the Status ofForces Agreement (SOFA) between the two countries that provides United
States service members with a degree of protection from Korean law enforcement procedures.
Some South Korean government officials believe the SOFA grants unfair privileges to United
States soldiers, and they are attempting to modify the agreement. The most galling aspect of
the United States - ROK SOFA is that it is more permissive than similar United States
agreements with Japan and Germany. [Ref 58]
In April 1995, when the Framework Agreement seemed to be faltering, many South
Koreans were worried that the United States and North Korea were cutting deals without
regard to the South's interests. [Ref. 53] President Kim made it clear that the South would
provide financial and technical assistance to the North only under the terms of the agreement.
The perception that the United States was willing to accommodate North Korean demands
in order to meet its global objective of preserving the NPT, even if it meant that it would
have to compromise South Korea's goal of increasing official contact with the North, was
frustrating for most South Koreans. [Ref. 59]
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However, by April 1996 American and South Korean diplomatic efforts demonstrated
more coordination. President Clinton and President Kim proposed a four-party meeting with
the North, including China to discuss a lasting peace. Although the Chinese endorsed the plan
the North Koreans remain intransigent.
In September 1996 a couple dozen North Korean spies slipped ashore in South Korea
from a submarine. The incident led to a massive and bloody man hunt that proved
embarrassing for the South Korean military as well as President Kim. In response to the
incident the United States led international consortium stopped work on the reactors being
built for North Korea in Sinpo. Rumors widely circulated in the press suggested that
American persuasian prevented the South Korean government from taking a military response
to the North's incursion.
In Han Sung-Joo's opinion the United States - ROK relationship is becoming more
normal as South Korea matures. In the past, South Korea viewed the United States as a kind
of "big brother" (in the Confucian sense) that looked after its client's interests. Now that the
United States and South Korea take their trade disputes to the WTO as equals, and as
Koreans feel more able to conduct their affairs independently, it is only natural that a new
style of relationship should develop. This development will necessarily extend to security
issues as well.
3. The United States - Japan Security Relationship and Korean Interests
Korean security analysts and politicians continue to see the United States military
presence in Japan as a check on any potential remilitarization of Japan. They view the recent
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qualitative improvements in the capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces as being consistent
with Japan's stated goals of improving its interoperability with United States forces, and the
strengthening of its own defensive posture.
Any sudden unraveling of the United States - Japan security relationship could
produce a more militarily capable, or pacifistic Japan. Neither of these outcomes would be
desirable from Korea's point of view since the former might be a direct threat to Korea, and
the latter might encourage China to be more aggressive militarily in the region. [Ref 60]
From the Korean perspective the most preferable scenario is one in which Japan is an
active contributor to world peace and order under the aegis of the U.N. The Koreans would
rather see Japan devote most of these efforts to the civilian side of peacekeeping such as
increased Japanese financial support for U.N. operations, the participation of Japanese
nationals in leadership roles (like the work of Akashi Yasushi, Ogata Sadako), and increased
official development assistance (ODA) to the world's poorer countries. However, Koreans
understand and accept Japan's need to expand the participation of its SelfDefense Forces in
PKO operations in order to secure its bid to gain a seat on the U.N. Security Council.
The Koreans welcomed the reaffirmation of security ties between America and Japan
made during the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit in April 1996. The current status quo in the rest
of Asia allows them to focus on North-South issues.
If the United States - Japan security relationship was drastically modified, the
Koreans would seek a clarification of Japan's global military role. They would try to establish
transparency of Japan's intentions through the formation of a robust, sub-regional, multilateral
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dialogue that would include Japan. At the same time, the Koreans would improve its military
posture in areas it viewed as deficient. For example, in anticipation of an eventual United
States withdrawal from the region the South Koreans have already embarked on a diesel
submarine, and anti-submarine warfare programs that seeks to eventually match Japanese
force levels and capabilities.
C. SOUTHEAST ASIAN FACTOR
The end of the Cold War has caused significant changes in the security environment
in Southeast Asia. Both superpowers have dramatically reduced their military presence in the
area as Russian naval combatants, and strike aircraft have withdrawn from Vietnam, and the
United States has pulled its forces out of the Philippines. Vietnamese expansionism of the
1970s and 1980s has ended as that country turns its attentions to economic development, and
political engagement with its neighbors. The civil war in Cambodia continues but on a less
dangerous scale since Vietnam and China have reached an agreement regarding their
involvement in the conflict.
The states ofASEAN (Brunei [joined in 1984], Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand) have achieved some of the more important goals they set out to
accomplish in 1967 when the organization was formed. At the time of ASEAN's inception,
the primary threat to the security ofthe member states was believed to be domestic upheaval,
rather than external aggression (although some did worry about Vietnam's intentions).
Because economic problems were seen as the cause of domestic unrest, the association
sought to increase security of its members by encouraging economic development and
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cooperation. The possibility of military cooperation was rejected because the organizers
believed that it might lead to external security threats. They also wanted their regional
organization to be largely free ofthe influence of outside powers. However, the members of
ASEAN continued to depend on the presence of the United States military in the region as
an ultimate guarantee of their external security.
The members ofASEAN have succeeded in suppressing their domestic insurgencies,
and most have experienced rapid growth over the last few decades (but not as a result of
economic cooperation and integration among the members). While their association has not
eliminated mutual suspicions, and numerous territorial disputes between the members,
ASEAN has served as an effective forum for containing internal, subregional conflict, and
establishing consensus among its members in the face of regional concerns. ASEAN's work
in attempting to manage the Spratly Island dispute is a case in point, and will be discussed
later.
Recently, ASEAN has attempted to become the core of security discussions for
nations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Their desire to recreate on a larger scale the
ASEAN deliberative process that "dispenses with prepared texts and [in which] issues are
actively discussed in a friendly atmosphere" is innovative. [Ref 61] Pacific-wide security
discussions are a new phenomenon. ASEAN is using these expanded fora to ensure that it
has a say in the security structures that will replace Cold War arrangements. Security
structures that will largely be determined by the major powers in the region — China, Japan,
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the United States, and Russia. These meetings also allow it to bring attention to local security
concerns like the Spratlys.
The two fora spawned by ASEAN that have added to the movement towards
multilateralism in Asia are ASEAN's PMC, and the newer ARF. The PMC is held each year
after the ASEAN foreign minister's meeting, and includes the members states plus the foreign
ministers of America, the European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and
South Korea. The PMC's focus is on economic and security issues. The ARF includes the
PMC participants plus former adversaries like China, Vietnam, and Russia. The first meeting
of ARF took place in the Summer of 1994 in Bangkok. The meeting was limited to three
hours, and did not accomplish much. [Ref 62] However, these may be the first steps toward
a multilateral process that may eventually help to solve conflicts of interest in the region.
1. The Current Role of the United States in Southeast Asia
When the United States began its withdrawal from the Philippines in 1991, other
Southeast Asian states felt the need to prevent a complete departure of United States forces
from the area. After concluding an agreement with Singapore, the United States moved a
small logistics unit ofthe Seventh Fleet from Subic Bay to that geostrategically located city-
state. Some neighboring states initially worried that this would constitute a United States
base there. [Ref. 63] When the United States demonstrated that it intended to use the
facilities in Singapore to mainly support ships en route the Persian Gulf these anxieties were
eliminated. All of the ASEAN states have some sort of military relationship with America
that helps to promote a degree of United States military presence in the region. Memoranda
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of understanding between the United States and most of the ASEAN members gives United
States ships and airplanes of certain numbers access to specific airfields for repair,
provisioning, and joint exercises. [Ref. 64] The continued, low-key presence of United
States forces in the region is seen as a guarantee against the possible emergence of Chinese
hegemonism, and as a means to protect the flow of goods through vital sea lanes.
The 1996 United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security served to ease the
concern of those Southeast Asians worried about American commitment to the region. At
the same time many ASEAN nations worry about coordinated American and Japanese efforts
that could take the lead in managing regional security. The 1996 Joint Declaration specifically
mentions the importance ofARF and other such regional dialogues. ASEAN does not want
to see any major power coopt ARF. [Ref. 65]
Southeast Asian nations are generally pleased with the level of security cooperation
they enjoy with the United States, and are hesitant to improve it in even incremental ways.
In November 1994, Thailand turned down a United States request to pre-position six ships
loaded with military supplies in its waters. The Thai minister refused on the grounds that it
would cause an adverse reaction among its neighbors. [Ref. 66] Southeast Asian states are
keen on maintaining their independent, non-aligned position, and seek to avoid military
arrangements that may provoke a Chinese response.
The crisis in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 left the region almost entirely mute. It
is opposed to China's bullying tactics but does not wish to offend Beijing by saying so. This
comment was made by one Southeast Asian diplomat concerning the crisis and the American
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response: "China has been around here for 3,000 years. The United States has been out here
for 50 years. We figure you are maybe good for another twenty years. But after that you will
be gone, and we will be left here alone with China. We cannot afford confrontation." [Ref.
67]
This desire for a more independent control of their own security coupled with their
newly created, economic wealth have made this region one of the world's leading purchaser
of arms. In 1994, Malaysia bought Mig-29, F/A-18, and Hawk fighter aircraft. Singapore
purchased eighteen F-16s, and the Thais have bought a number of air and naval systems from
China and Spain. Southeast Asian states continue to professionalize their militaries as they
turn the focus oftheir forces from internal security roles to external threats. [Ref. 68] These
arms build-ups reflect the level of anxiety that these nations feel about the intentions of their
neighbors, as well as the post-Cold War environment in general.
2. The Spratly Island Dispute and Regional Security
The one current issue that may drive Southeast Asians into a collective security pact
despite their intra-regional differences is China's stance on its claims to over one hundred
coral reefs, and shallow banks in the South China Sea — the Spratlys. Until recently China
focused its energies on confronting Vietnam regarding its claims to the islands. In 1988, a
Chinese frigate sank a Vietnamese auxiliary near Fiery Cross Reef. In the Spring of 1995, the
Chinese put up shelters on Mishief Reef near the Philippines, thereby sparking a
confrontation with one ofASEAN s weakest members militarily. In 1994, Indonesia learned
that China claimed the waters around its Natuna gas field.
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China's behavior prompted ASEAN to sponsor a conferences on the Spratlys dispute
in 1993. The conference produced an agreement to conduct joint scientific surveys of the
area, but avoided the ownership issue entirely. [Ref. 69] While it could not be called a
success it did provide the opportunity for representatives from Vietnam and China to meet
on the subject. China has refused to rule out the use of force in settling the ownership issue.
This has helped to open the way for Vietnam to join ASEAN in July 1995. Following the
incident near the Philippines ASEAN made its first collective stand against Chinese
assertiveness. [Ref. 70]
The dispute has caused some Southeast Asian nations to turn to America. The
Commander-in Chief ofthe Indonesian armed forces recently sought assurances of continued
United States military presence in the area. [Ref. 71] Following the thirty-seventh annual
meeting of the Philippines - United States Mutual Defense Board in Manila in June 1995,
Admiral Macke, Commander-in Chief United States Forces Pacific, announced that more
United States ships will visit the Philippines. [Ref. 72] Also, Vietnam is anxious to establish
warm relations with the United States in order to balance China's assertiveness in the region.
United States oil companies are already involved in the dispute between China, and
Vietnam over this issue. Creystone Oil Corporation of Denver, Colorado, is drilling for oil
under a Chinese contract in an area that Vietnam has leased to Mobil Corporation. (Vietnam
is taking its claim in this particular area to the International Court of Justice to order to seek
a ruling based on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.) [Ref. 73]
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3. Conclusion
If the ASEAN claimants to the Spratlys are able to peacefully establish a joint
development program to exploit the resources in the area, as China is reportedly amenable
to, then the Southeast Asian demands for United States security assurances will lessen. The
United States has marginal interests in becoming militarily involved in the intra-regional
disputes of Southeast Asians unless these disputes threaten to seriously disrupt the flow of
vital commodities to the United States America does have an interest in preventing the
emergence of a hegemonic power in the region.
The relative economic importance ofthe United States to Southeast Asian economies
continues to decline. Japanese investment in Southeast Asia has been outstripping United
States investment there for years. South Koreans have invested heavily in the Vietnamese
economy following normalization of their relations. Since 1990, Prime Minister Mahatir of
Malaysia has been calling for the formulation of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that
would exclude the United States and Australia, and would represent Asian economic interests.
In summary, the military and economic leverage that the United States once had has
declined as Southeast Asian Nations have matured, and as regional interdependence and
cooperation has grown.
D. THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
In the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Soviet Union was engaged in a substantial
build up of its ground, naval, and strategic forces in its Far Eastern Theater the USSR was
a principal actor in the affairs of East Asia. With Russian naval forces rusting at the piers in
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Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, its ground forces cut by fifty percent in the theater, and the
overall readiness of its military steadily decreasing, it has nearly lost its primary means of
influence in the region.
The attention of Russian leadership is focused on the "near abroad" — its former
satellites situated nearer to Russia's European, geopolitical center of gravity — and on
maintaining order within the Russian republic by suppressing separatist movements in places
like Chechnya. Moscow closely watches developments in the newly formed republics on its
western and southern borders due to its historical, strategic concerns as well as its interest in
the large expatriate Russian population in these areas. Russians in the sparsely populated Far
East have felt ignored by Moscow, and have occasionally threatened to form their own
autonomous region during the last few years.
Russia's important Cold War alliances with North Korea, and Vietnam have gradually
withered away. It is no longer able or willing to provide these two former clients with
economic or military aid. Instead it seeks to expand the trade relationship with South Korea,
and has even offered to barter military weaponry for South Korean consumer goods. Russia
is also in the business of supplying military weapons to Vietnam's nemesis, China.
Domestic politics in Russia make it difficult for President Yeltsin to conduct a
consistent foreign policy vis-a-vis Asia. Within the Russian Parliament there are two broadly
defined, opposing groups on foreign policy issues. The "Atlanticists" advocate Russian entry
into the Western European community, while the "Eurasians" want Russia to expand its ties
with China, South Korea, and India. [Ref 74] The "Eurasians" have been extremely critical
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of Yeltsin's perceived acquiescence to Western interests, and support greater Russian
involvement in the near abroad. The far right wing of this group has criticized Yeltsin for
abandoning former allies like North Korea and Vietnam. They also have rebuked his
willingness to cooperate with the United States and the U.N. in putting pressure on North
Korea to comply with the NPT, and in peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. [Ref.
75]
1. United States Interests and Russia
One ofthe clearest divergences in United States and Japanese foreign policy since the
end of the Cold War has been their respective stances toward Russia. While the United States
has focused its efforts on encouraging continued political and economic reform within Russia,
and has sought Russia's cooperation on weapons proliferation issues, Japan has given priority
to the resolution of the Kuril Islands territorial dispute.
At the G-7 Summit in July 1993, the United States and its Western partners pressured
Japan into providing Russia with an aid package designed to buttress Russian reform efforts.
The previous September Japan had been shocked by the last-minute cancellation of President
Yeltsin's scheduled visit to Tokyo for discussions on the Northern Territories issue. This
sudden cancellation of his visit to Tokyo, and his subsequent visit to Seoul caused the
Japanese to feel even greater mistrust regarding Russian intentions. Japan still refuses to
abandon its policy of linking substantial economic assistance to a favorable resolution of the
Kurils dispute.
66
A speech given by President Clinton at Moscow State University on May 10, 1995,
reemphasized America's main concerns about United States - Russian relations. The
President underlined the importance of Russia's continued commitment to free markets, and
democracy, developing a special Russian role with NATO, ending the fighting in Chechnya,
working together on proliferation issues, and combating organized crime. [Ref. 76] The only
mention of Asia was a reference to the gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and that Russia's
cooperation was needed to stop terrorist types of crimes like these. Clinton's speech
demonstrates the Eurocentric focus of United States - Russian relations. [Ref. 76]
2. Russian Economic Ties to the Region
Currently the Russian economy can only offer military hardware, and raw materials
in its trade with most Asian nations. In fact, it is Russia's arms trade with China that
represents its greatest impact on Asian security calculations. So far, Russia has sold Kilo
diesel submarines, SU-27 fighter aircraft, SA-10 surface-to-air missiles, transport aircraft for
use by Chinese paratroopers, along with other weapons systems. More importantly, over
three thousand Russian engineers have been hired by China to improve the PRC's own arms
industry. [Ref. 77]
China has become Russia's second largest trading partner after Germany. The
increased trade along the Sino-Russian border (valued at $7.7 billion in 1993) has also
brought an influx of an estimated 2.5 million Chinese into the Russian Far East. [Ref 78]
These large numbers of Chinese in a sparsely populated part of Russia have caused Moscow
67
to worry about Chinese irredentism. Stricter controls on the flow of people across the border
were put in place in 1994.
Russian trade with Japan is minimal due to the Kurils dispute. However, Russian
traders are more visible in Hokkaido, and northern Honshu as they shop for used Japanese
cars, and car parts. In Vladivostok four out of five cars on the street are made in Japan.
[Ref. 79] Also, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi have joined other oil firms in a $10 billion, offshore
oil and gas development project near Sakhalin. [Ref. 79]
Trade with South Korea has been slowed by Russia's inability to pay off its debts to
the Koreans. However, South Korean conglomerate Daewoo has made substantial
investments in the Russian Far East that have included a chain of retail outlets, and the
construction of a natural gas pipeline.
The port of Vladivostok, opened by the czars as a freeport, is perfectly situated to
take advantage of the vast potential for further economic growth in Northeast Asia. Near the
borders of China and Korea, with access to the natural resource wealth, and tourist potential
ofthe Russian Far East, it will continue to attract foreign investment. Alexei Arbatov points
out that the future of Russia would benefit more than any other country from reunification
ofthe two Koreas on conditions of a market economy. [Ref. 80] Similarly, resolution of the
Kurils dispute with Japan would spark economic growth in this area.
3. The Future Outlook for Russian Policy in Asia
While most Russian leaders and security analysts recognize that their position in Asia
will remain weak and vulnerable in the near term, they insist upon having a say in any security
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arrangements that develop in the region. The nationalistic element in Russian politics
continues to have a large influence on Russian foreign policy initiatives in Asia.
In January 1994, during an official visit to Beijing, Foreign Minister Kozyrev outlined
the increasing importance ofthe Asia-Pacific region to world affairs, and the goals of Russian
foreign policy in the area.
1
.
The region's importance for the future ofRussia is increasing, primarily because
the economic role ofthe Asian part ofRussia is growing. Trade ties with Asia are
also growing stronger, accounting for one-third of Russia's trade.
2. Interstate relations in the Asia-Pacific region will be multipolar, as the future lies
in cooperation among the leading powers. Russia wants stable, balanced relations
with all Asia-Pacific states, and there are no powers or groupings with which
Russia has irreconcilable contradictions.
3 The danger of military conflict is low and the importance of the military factor
has decreased. Tensions do remain and several problems must be dealt with —
access to seabed resources, a number of border disputes, religious and national
extremism in Central Asia.
4. The economic role of the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for 60 percent of
the world's industrial output, will continue into the Twenty-first century.
International relations of states will be determined by the extent of their
involvement in regional economic relations and their participation in regional
associations. Russia welcomed China at the APEC Summit in Seattle and hopes
China will aid its entrance into APEC.
5. Economic progress contributes to ensuring human rights. [Ref 81]
Clearly Russia does not plan to be left out of the economic, political, and social
changes underway in Asia.
To date, Russia has made the greatest progress in solving its problems with its most
dangerous, former Asian adversary — China. Following his meeting with Chinese Foreign
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Minister Qian in January 1994, Kozyrev hailed the progress made in strengthening Sino-
Russian cooperation. "It is now possible for the two powers to coordinate their interests in
Asia and worldwide." [Ref. 82] After discussions between Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin in August
1994 regarding the border dispute that precipitated the Sino-Soviet conflict, Yeltsin declared
that "for the first time in the history of Russian-Chinese relations the border between the two
countries is legally fixed." [Ref. 80] The Russians and Chinese have also agreed to stop
targeting their nuclear missiles at each other, and to sharply limit the number of their troops
on the border. [Ref. 84]
The drastic reduction in Sino-Russian tensions appears to increase the prospects for
peace in the region, and brightens the possibilities for further cooperation on economic and
security issues. However, this development also allows China to concentrate its attention on
other security concerns, and goals. Depending on China's intentions this could either cause
China to be less cautious in asserting itself militarily elsewhere; or it might lead to a China that
is more content with the status quo and the promotion of further security cooperation with
its other neighbors.
Alexei Arbatov warns that the present slant ofRussian foreign policy in favor of China
could put Moscow in a position of dependence on Beijing in the region. Therefore he
advocates the conclusion of an agreement with Japan on the Kurils, and the implementation
of confidence building measures that would reduce naval tensions between the two countries.
[Ref. 80] In the Fall of 1994, the JMSDF and the Russian Navy conducted their first joint
Russian-Japanese naval exercise — a rescue at sea operation. However, the shooting
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incidents in the Kurils in which Russian border guards have wounded Japanese fishermen
caste a cloud over Russian-Japanese relations.
Arbatov also sees a unified and strong Korea as being in Russia's security interests as
well as its economic ones. [Ref. 80] An independent, and militarily capable Korea would be
a check on Chinese and Japanese ambitions.
The ability ofRussia to expand its influence in Asia largely depends on whether it can
put its own house in order. The domestic political fight over Russia's military adventure in
Chechnya has split the country, and has dramatically weakened Yeltsin and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin 1 political base. [Ref. 84] Russia's humiliation at the hands of a group of
Chechen terrorists caused the Parliament to approve a motion of no confidence in Yeltsin's
faltering government in June of 1995. Even though Yeltsin was re-elected in 1996, his poor
health and fractured government indicate that political stability in Russia is still at stake.
Conservative leader Alexander Lebed's popularity reportedly remains high after his dismissal
by Yeltsin as national security chief. With the Russian constitution concentrating power in
the hands of the president, there are worries in the West that Russia might drift back towards
autocracy if the next elections produce a more conservative presidency. In his May 1995
speech in Moscow, President Clinton urged Yeltsin and the Parliament to stick to their
pledges to retain democratic transitions of power. [Ref. 76]
Relations with the United States will continue to focus on conflicts of interest in
Europe, and on certain grand strategic issues that will have an impact on Asia. Once an
agreement with Russia is reached on the expansion ofNATO membership, an important
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stumbling block in United States - Russian relations will be removed. This, of course, will
have positive effects on any efforts of the two countries to deal with mutual concerns in Asia.
United States efforts to build a ballistic missile defense system have been viewed by
the Russians as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Given the
apparent intention of the Republican Congress to proceed with research and testing of such
systems, it is likely that the United States and Russia will spend a lot of time trying to reach
a mutually acceptable modification to the ABM Treaty. [Ref. 85] If Japan buys a U.S.-
designed ABM system, as the United States hopes, this will also modify the Asian military
balance.
Some Asian, and American defense analysts continue to see Russia as a medium to
long term threat. People like Norman Polmar point to the Russian commitment to improve
its nuclear submarine force despite the economic adversity faced by its government as
evidence oftheir intentions. The CIA and the Office ofNaval Intelligence are in disagreement
about the Russian's ability to produce numbers of quieter submarines. [Ref. 86] Which ever
position is correct, the continued presence of Russian ballistic missile, and attack submarines
in the Sea of Japan, the Western Pacific, and offthe United States Atlantic coast demonstrates
Russia's desires to be taken seriously in both hemispheres.
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IV. JAPAN IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLICY AT THE END OF THE COLD
WAR
A. DETERIORATING IMAGE OF UNITED STATES IN JAPANESE EYES
Even prominent Japanese politicians and opinion-makers who have a reputation for
being pro-US. are sometimes quoted in the American press making what many Americans
consider to be scandalous remarks about the deteriorating state of United States society.
Typically, they refer to the growing laziness ofAmerican workers, the low levels of education
and literacy of most Americans, and the problems caused by drugs and racial strife in the
United States. The caricature of smiling Japanese politicians or businessmen wearing the
required dark suits and glasses, and berating America's work ethic has been used as parody
in "Saturday Night Live" skits as well as American political cartoons. However, among many
Japanese there is a commonly held perception that America's social and economic problems
are profound and, as a result, call into question the wisdom of following America's lead on
international political and economic issues.
In a lecture given at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in October 1994,
Professor Matsuyama Yukio, a prominent journalist and political analyst, explained what
could best be described as America's fall from grace in the eyes of a generation of Japanese
who had experienced defeat at the hands of an industrial giant, had been saved from starvation
by United States largesse, and now see a selfish, splintered America that lacks vibrancy and
self-confidence. Among younger generations ofJapanese, the current impressions of America
are not tempered by the experiences ofthose who lived in its shadow in the 1940s and 1950s.
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Kenbei (contempt for America) is more common among these younger generations of
Japanese businessmen and bureaucrats who see their future being increasing influenced by
forces outside of United States - Japanese connections.
Within the various bureaucracies, the best and brightest of the younger bureaucrats
are no longer drawn to departments that focus directly on United States - Japan bilateral
issues. In the Defense Agency, peacekeeping operations and developing ties with regional
militaries are part of the new frontier. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) those
bureaus that deal with foreign economic affairs and expanded European and Asian affairs are
more attractive. [Ref 87] [Ref 88] For the past several years, Japanese politicians and
bureaucrats have been able to strengthen their domestic political positions, or advance their
careers by standing up to American demands. Sakakibara Eisuke, a negotiator from the
Ministry of Finance during the United States - Japan Economic Framework Talks in 1994,
was promoted to Director General of the International Finance Bureau after gaining a
reputation for being a tough negotiator. After flatly rejecting a United States - proposed draft
agreement during the Framework Talks, he was quoted as saying "when I taught at Harvard,
I would have given an 'F' to such an examination paper." [Ref. 88]
Ambassador Ogura Kazuo, a long-time MOFA bureaucrat and student of the United
States - Japan communication gap, explains the United States - Japanese friction as the result
of different national courses. "It is we might say a gap between a disoriented people and an
idealistic empire." [Ref. 89] He and other Japanese leaders see the need to maintain aspects
ofthe U.S.- Japan security relationship. However, they are insistent that Japan, at times, must
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diverge from American policy. Ogura says, "There is no need for Japan to follow the United
States in Asia diplomacy; Japan should construct a new axis for its Asia diplomacy." [Ref.
88]
B. THE CHINA FACTOR
Japan and China signed a Treaty of Friendship with each other in August 1978, six
years after Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Beijing, and the establishment of normalized Sino-
Japanese relations. The reason that such a treaty took so long to conclude was that Japan
was hesitant to be drawn into the triangle of power politics going on among the United
States, China, and the USSR.; and Japan's inability to get China to acknowledge its claims
over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands. China was intent on aiming the Sino-Japanese treaty at
the Soviets by including an anti-hegemony clause that clearly referred to perceived Soviet
ambitions. Japan eventually agreed to accept a more omni-directional clause that became
Article II of the treaty:
The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in
the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to
efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
[Ref. 90]
Ironically, this part ofthe Treaty ofPeace and Friendship may have a new, and more
important relevance to current Sino-Japanese relations. As the two countries increase the
level of their bilateral trade and the frequency of their official and unofficial contacts, they still
eye each other's future intentions warily. Their neighbors in the region are also waiting to see
if either country develops the hegemonic ambitions that both have foresworn.
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Many security analysts believe that Japan or China will emerge as the dominant Asian
power in the Twenty-first century and, as a result, will have the greatest influence on the
formation of security relationships in the region. An article in the Christian Science Monitor
put China in the lead in the Sino-Japanese competition for influence in Asia. [Ref. 91] Citing
an Asahi Shimbun poll that showed a lack of confidence in Japan's international leadership
ability, along with China's growing relative economic strength and its aggressive stance in
international fora (as compared to Japan's timidity), the article sees a Japan that is quickly
becoming a second rank power. [Ref. 91] However, by most accounts, this kind of
conclusion is extremely premature — especially given China's internal political and social
problems. Japan still displays a willingness to compete with or confront China in areas where
their interests clash.
One issue that was left unresolved by their Treaty of Peace and Friendship was the
two countries' claims over the Senkaku Islands, and other maritime territory in the East China
Sea. Deng Xiaoping gave the Japanese repeated assurances that the issue would be shelved,
and that China would not repeat a 1978 incident in which over one hundred Chinese fishing
boats were sent to the area to protest Japanese claims. [Ref. 92] However, a year after he
made those promises China sent fifty fishing boats to the islands to protest Japan's
construction of a helicopter pad on Senkaku Gunto (Diaoyu Dao). [Ref. 92] In 1990, the
Taiwanese brought attention to the dispute when two fishing vessels carrying members of the
opposition (Democratic Progressive) party, as well as a contingent of Taiwanese athletes,
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attempted to land on the islands in order to run a torch relay to reinforce Taiwan's claims to
the Senkakus. [Ref. 69]
In July 1 996 a Japanese ultra-rightest group called Nihon Seinen Sha (Japan Youth
Federation) put up a make shift lighthouse on Uozuri-jima sparking a vociferous and active
response from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Beijing limited its reaction to severe
condemnation of the groups activities, and called on Tokyo to dismantle the lighthouse.
However, some Hong Kong residents, and Taiwanese conducted anti-Japanese
demonstrations. In the fall of 1996, some at-sea demonstrations were held during which a
Hong Kong resident drowned.
The most disturbing developments from Japan's point ofview began in February 1992
when China's Fourteenth Party Congress passed its "Territorial Waters Law":
Article II
PRC territorial waters are the sea areas that touch the Chinese territories.
These territories include the continent of China, Taiwan, and the Senkaku
Islands...
Article VI
...military ships must be granted permission to sail through Chinese territorial
waters by the PRC government. [Ref. 69]
The Japanese were caught off guard by this assertion of Chinese territorial claims. Thinking
that China had intended to handle the issue quietly, the Japanese government was confused
about how to interpret China's motivations.
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During the same time-frame, attacks upon Japanese fishing and merchant vessels that
were operating in or transiting the area began to increase. From 1991 until the Spring of
1993 over sixty-five incidents occurred in which Japanese vessels were either chased, shot at,
or boarded by Chinese-crewed vessels in international waters. [Ref. 93] Most of the incidents
occurred in an area of the East China Sea that both countries claim as being part of their
maritime economic exclusion zones. Since it was apparent that at least some of the incidents
involved Chinese officials, the Japanese government interpreted these actions as being part
ofthe PRC's policy. While Japan recognized China's need to control the enormous smuggling
(cigarettes, guns, drugs, and people) operations that take place off of its coast, it was
disturbed by the level offorce employed, and a trend that showed the attacks occurring much
closer to Okinawan waters. The Japanese also suspected that the Chinese government was
using these incidents to gain defacto control over disputed maritime territories by scaring
away Japanese vessels.
Japanese reaction to these perceived threats was direct. In December of 1991, the
Japanese embassy in Beijing requested that the PRC investigate incidents in which Chinese-
flagged vessels fired shots at Japanese vessels near the Senkaku Islands [Ref. 94]. The Japan
Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) increased its surface and air patrols in the area, and
eventually established an office in Okinawa that was specifically charged with monitoring such
incidents. [Ref. 85] Coordination between the MSA and JSDF (particularly the JMSDF) was
enhanced in response to this new danger. By July of 1992, the Japanese finally got the
Chinese government to admit that its vessels had been involved in some of the attacks when
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Japanese officials presented Beijing with photographic, as well as other evidence that proved
their complicity. [Ref. 96] In February 1993, China issued an official apology for their
involvement in the attacks. By the Summer of 1993 the two governments had held several
formal and informal meetings to discuss ways of preventing these incidents in the future.
Working level meetings between the MSA, JMSDF, Japan's Fisheries Agency, and China's
Public Security Ministry, custom authorities, and Navy helped to establish specific procedures
that would prevent more illegal acts against Japanese vessels in the East China Sea. [Ref. 97]
While smuggling and anti-smuggling operations are as lively as ever along China's
southeastern seaboard, incidents involving attacks against or illegal inspections of Japanese
vessels in these waters have nearly ceased since the Summer of 1993. [Ref. 98] [Ref. 93]
Elsewhere, Chinese ships continue to be involved in piracy or aggressive anti-smuggling
operations (depending on one's point of view). [Ref. 98]
The constructive and forthright way in which China and Japan handled what could
have been a potentially explosive issue may serve as a model for resolving similar Sino-
Japanese conflicts in the future.
1. Broad Security Concerns
Japan's 1996 defense white paper upgraded its "watch" on China. Tokyo recognizes
that China is going to need more attention from the Self-Defense Forces. [Ref. 93] It is
concerned about what China's growing defense budget and improving military capabilities will
mean for the future of the Asian security environment.
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In 1987 the PRC and Japan began a series of military-to-military talks designed to
improve mutual understanding about each other's capabilities and intentions. The talks were
suspended following the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In the Spring of 1994 these talks were
resumed. The Japanese hope to encourage greater transparency in Chinese defense programs,
and to allay Chinese fears about Japan's acquisition of improved weaponry. At the 1994
meeting, the Japanese asked the Chinese to publish a white paper similar to the one published
every year by Japan's Defense Agency. [Ref. 99] The Chinese appear hesitant to be as open
as the Japanese are about their defense programs. However, the exchange of briefings
between the United States Department ofDefense and the Chinese military in the Spring of
1995 regarding defense issues may signal China's willingness to become more involved in such
broad-based confidence-building measures.
In February 1995, the Chairman of the Joint Staff of the JSDF, Nishimoto Tetsuya,
visited China and South Korea for discussions on security issues. During his meeting with
the Chinese, he reiterated Japan's desires that China disclose details of its armaments and
overall defense budget. [Ref 101] He also expressed Japan's concern about the possibility
that the Spratly Islands' dispute could affect sea lanes that are vital to its interests. [Ref. 101]
Japan is particularly worried about Chinese actions that will spark arms build-ups in
the region. Some ofthe menacing statements that China has made toward Taiwan regarding
its bid for a more independent international role, as well as China's military moves in the
Spratlys, have already caused nations in the region to upgrade their defensive capabilities.
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Japan's ODA is specifically linked to four criteria: the extent of military spending in
the recipient country; the degree of its arms imports or exports; the country's development
and possession ofweapons ofmass destruction; and, finally, its level of democracy. [Ref 102]
Although Japan, unlike the United States, has been reluctant to criticize China over its
weapon exports, it has repeatedly requested that China halt its nuclear testing. In October
of 1994, China conducted its fourty-first underground nuclear test despite international
attempts to establish a moratorium on nuclear testing. Foreign Minister Kono Yohei called
the test "regrettable," and called for a reexamination ofODA assistance to China. [Ref. 103]
Following another Chinese underground nuclear test in the Spring of 1995, Japan announced
that it would cut grant aid to China. This was the first time that Japan used cuts in its
economic aid to protest Chinese policy. [Ref. 104]
Despite the worries that Japanese leaders have about the future capabilities of an
emergent China, many Japanese think that an image of a "China threat" is being used by
American and Japanese officials to gain the public's acceptance of a continuing United States -
Japan security relationship. [Ref. 105] The Japanese government is also more confident in
the stability of the Chinese government than are American officials Foreign Minister Kono
responded skeptically to a recent Pentagon report on the possibility of China breaking up into
semi-autonomous political regions after the death ofDeng Xiaoping. Kono said
I do not think that China will move toward disintegration after his death. The
country will rather promote its march toward moderate democratization. [Ref.
106]
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China is also less concerned with Japan's current military and political posture than
what future changes might bring. Analysts at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in
Beijing fear a creeping improvement in Japan's military capability that might lead it to acquire
a significant capability for offensive action. [Ref. 107] They point to Japan's extremely
capable navy, and Japanese discussions of acquiring aircraft carriers in order to conduct
PKO, and rescue operations as evidence of the organic improvements that could lead to a
militarily aggressive Japan. [Ref. 107] The Chinese also worry about the United States
pressure on Japan to improve its self-defense capabilities through the purchase of advanced,
American weapon systems. The Chinese have warned the United States about the regional
instability that would be caused if an advanced ballistic missile defense system were deployed
in Japan or South Korea. [Ref. 103] They fear that their nuclear deterrent could be made
obsolete, and therefore, make them vulnerable to a nuclear first strike if its neighbors
possessed such capabilities.
2. A Mutual Understanding
In general, the bilateral economic and political ties between Japan and China have
developed rapidly despite the stormy relationship between Japan's security partner and the
PRC. In 1991, bilateral trade between the two countries reached $22.8 billion [Ref. 54] This
was the same year that the value of Japan's exports to Asia surpassed its exports to the United
States [Ref. 38]. In 1992, the Japanese business leader Kobayashi Yotaro urged Japan to
work with China in order to develop a relationship that would make them "co-chairman" of
the region. [Ref. 109] From 1990 to 1993, Japan's direct investment in China grew from
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$350 million to $1.5 billion. [Ref. 38] Enthusiasm among Japanese companies interested in
increasing their offshore production sites in China continues as the consumer markets in China
expand.
The Japanese government has also been more accommodating towards China on trade
issues than either the United States or European governments. In MITI's annual blacklist of
unfair trade partners for 1995, China was praised for its progress on improving the uniformity
ofthe trade system employed by its various regions, while the United States received the most
"black balls" of any of the trading partners listed. [Ref. 1 10] In contrast, the United States
blocked China's bid to join the World Trade Organization in 1994 and early 1995.
Japan has worked to prevent the political isolation of China when the PRC's relations
with the West were faltering. It has also attempted to put wartime memories to rest by
sending Emperor Akihito (in 1992) and its prime ministers on goodwill visits to China.
Although Japan initially joined the West in imposing sanctions on China following the
Tiananmen Massacre, it was the first to put its bilateral relations with China back on a normal
footing. Prime Minister Kaifii was the first leader of a major industrialized democracy to visit
Beijing following the events in Tiananmen when he made a visit to China in August 1 99
1
Japan is sympathetic with China's assertion that economic development forms the basis
for human rights. The Japanese have been careful to avoid becoming involved in what the
PRC calls its "internal matters." Japan's recent refusal to allow Taiwan's President Lee to visit
Tokyo was meant to appease China's demands that it respect its "one China" policy.
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The events of March 1996 put Japan in a very uncomfortable position. While it is
opposed to China's use of military exercises to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate it certainly
would prefer that United States forces stationed in Japan not be used to openly confront
China. Japan is well within striking distance of Chinese ballistic missiles (as are certain cities
on the American west coast). It does not want to be drawn into a conflict caused by military
decisions made in Beijing and Washington.
In short, the Japanese believe that they enjoy a special relationship with China that
goes back to the age of the Japanese regent Prince Shotoku (574-622), and is based on a
common cultural heritage. From the Japanese perspective, there is a strong incentive for both
countries to cooperate on both economic and political fronts. They believe that, while there
is a danger of future conflict between the two powers, the current Asian security environment
offers the opportunity to develop mechanisms that can deal effectively with destabilizing
disputes.
C. THE KOREA FACTOR
As one of the most serious victims of past Japanese expansionism, Korea is
understandably anxious about how Japan's future role in the region will develop. However,
Koreans are also aware that a more influential Japan is inevitable and necessary now that the
Soviet Union has collapsed and America's relative power has declined.
From Japan's point ofview the stability of the Korean peninsula has always been vital
to its interests. It went to war with China in 1894, and Russia in 1904 in order to ensure that
Japan, and no other foreign power would exercise control over the peninsula. During the
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Korean War it gladly served as a storehouse and rear base for the U.N. forces fighting the
invaders from the North. Recently, when it appeared that North Korea was developing
nuclear weapons, and a ballistic missile delivery system, Japan became directly involved in the
crisis in order to guarantee that its interests would be protected. Though Japan worked with
the United States and South Korea to eventually secure the United States - North Korea
Framework Agreement, it did not hesitate to explore independent avenues, or attempt to
block United States initiatives that it considered to be unproductive. Japan was not
supportive of the United States when it threatened economic sanctions against the DPRK,
and North Korea made it clear that Japan might be targeted in a war that it said would
certainly result if such sanctions were imposed. During the impasse over North Korea's
reluctance to accept a South Korean-built reactor, Japan sent a high-ranking delegation made
up of senior politicians from each of the three ruling parties to North Korea. Arriving in late
March 1995, the delegation laid a wreath at the base of a huge bronze statue of the late Kim
D-Sung, reached an agreement to reopen talks on normalizing diplomatic relations between
the two countries, and made offers of massive economic aid in the form of compensation for
the Japanese occupation ofKorea from 1910 to 1945. [Ref. Ill]
While many Koreans suspect that Japan prefers a divided, and inward-looking Korea
to a unified peninsula, it appears that the Japanese are preparing for the latter eventuality. It
is in Japan's interest to facilitate a "soft-landing" scenario for Korean unification. A war
between the North and South would not only cause Japan to be flooded with refugees from
South Korea — including the family members of thousands of American servicemen — it
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could also result in direct attacks on Japanese soil either in the form of ballistic missiles or
terrorist attacks. In a soft-landing unification scenario, Japan will have more leverage over
the terms of reintegration of the DPRK and ROK. Because South Korea will need Japanese
technological and financial support to improve the North's infrastructure Japanese influence
on the peninsula will increase. [Ref. 1 12] Japan will probably gain economic concessions
from Korea as compensation for its willingness to invest more money in the North. Since
1971 Japan has invested more money in South Korea's industrial plants, equipment, and
inventory than any other foreign country. [Ref. 113] The mineral wealth, cheap labor, and
geographic location of North Korea make it the ideal target of such future Japanese
investment once it adopts a more market-oriented economy.
Japan will also want to ensure that a unified Korea goes through a substantial
demilitarization process. This will probably be another precondition for Japan's shouldering
some of the costs associated with the reunification process.
In the meantime, Japan will seek to "denuclearize" the peninsula; and continue to
monitor the ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. The successful test launch of a
North Korean ballistic missile ("No-Dong -1") with an estimated range of over 1,000
kilometers in May 1993 caused Japan to reevaluate its threat prioritization. The event was
particularly disturbing to the Japanese since the missile was launched into the middle of the
Sea ofJapan on a line ofbearing pointing to the geographic center of Japan. [Ref. 1 14] This
new vulnerability to immediate attack from North Korea will probably lead Japan to deploy
a TMD system in the near future.
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1. Security Cooperation with South Korea
Even though both Japan and South Korea were on the same side of the bipolar, Cold
War struggle, the two countries rarely interacted on security or defense-related issues. Most
of the contacts were made in the context of U.S. -sponsored exercises like RIMPAC
(exercises that Japan and South Korea viewed as "bilateral" evolutions between the United
States and them). United States officials were often used to relay their mutual concerns
regarding security issues. However, in recent years Japan and South Korea have made the
initial steps in establishing a bilateral security dialogue.
In November 1994, the two countries held the first working-level dialogue between
defense officials in Tokyo. South Korean Defense Minister Yi Pyong-Tae, and the Japan
Defense Agency Director General Aichi Kazuo agreed to discuss the general security climate
ofNortheast Asia with particular emphasis on the United States - North Korean Framework
Agreement, as well as plans for the mutual visits of training squadrons and other military
units. [Ref. 115] In February 1995, the two countries agreed to establish provisions that
would prevent accidental military engagements between the ROK Air Force and the Japan Air
Self Defense Force. The agreement will allow the two countries to exchange flight
information in their overlapping air identification zones. [Ref. 116] This is the kind of
confidence building measure that will help to reduce mutual suspicions between Japan and
Korea.
Japan has exhibited good will and a desire to cooperate with South Korea in its recent
dealings with North Korea. When North Korea recently turned to its ancient nemesis, Japan,
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for shipments ofrice in order to relieve chronic food shortages, South Korea requested that
Japan break offtalks on food aid for the North until it reached its own aid agreement with the
DPRK. Japan complied with the South's request. Subsequently, the ROK began its own
shipments to the DPRK ofwhat will amount to 150,000 tons of rice. [Ref 1 17] South Korea
hopes that these shipments will help to foster North-South diplomatic activity. Although the
North Koreans have stepped up their official, verbal abuse of the South recently, the DPRK
promised to release eight South Korean fishermen captured in North Korean waters on May
30, 1995. Japan also showed its solidarity with South Korea when it declared its support for
maintaining the ROK's central role in constructing a reactor in North Korea as stipulated
during the negotiations of the Framework Agreement.
2. The Future of the Relationship
Although South Koreans still have bitter memories of their Japanese colonial interlude,
the two peoples are gradually overcoming the barriers to mutual understanding put in place
by that experience. In August 1993, Seoul announced that it would halve the list ofbanned
Japanese imports over a five year period. [Ref. 1 18] During the Fall of 1994, South Korea
agreed to lower the barriers to cultural exchange with Japan. While a display of traditional
Japanese crafts at the Japan cultural center in Seoul drew protests that caused damage to
some of the display cases, a Japanese rendition of "Jesus Christ Superstar" was well received
by South Koreans. [Ref. 119]
On the political front a meeting between President Kim Young-Sam and Prime
Minister Hosokawa in November 1993 was more successful than previous South Korean -
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Japan summits. Hosokawa apologized for Japan's treatment of Koreans during the colonial
period with specific references being made to the emotional "comfort women" issue. Prime
Minister Murayama has also attempted to resolve the issue of compensating former comfort
women — most ofwhom were Korean. On July 19, 1995, he issued an apology to all the
women who Imperial Japan had forced into prostitution in the service of its military. He made
this apology at the inauguration of a private fund called the "Asian Peace and Friendship
Foundation for Women" that will give money to surviving comfort women. [Ref. 120] Many
critics of this new initiative believe the Japanese should do more to compensate these victims.
The war-apology resolution adopted by the Japanese Diet on June 9, 1995, also fell
short of what many of Japan's neighbors think is necessary to close that chapter of Asian
history. The resolution expressed Japan's remorse for suffering that it inflicted on its
neighbors, but did not give an explicit apology. [Ref. 121] Comments by the likes of former
Foreign Minister Watanabe, who also headed the recent delegation to North Korea, also did
not ease Japanese-Korean animosities. A few days before the vote on the war-apology
resolution he said that Japan's rule ofKorea had been "peacefully negotiated with the Korean
government of the day." [Ref. 121]
Clearly, the reconciliation between Japan and Korea will be a long and painful process.
However, the economic and political interests of both countries will force the two countries
to reach a deeper level ofcommon understanding as the Twenty-first century approaches, and
as they begin to exercise more independent control of their security policies.
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D. SOUTHEAST ASIAN FACTOR
Japan has been trying to transform its established economic clout into political
influence in Southeast Asian affairs. Its first attempts in the post-war era to exercise
leadership on regional security issues occurred during a meeting ofASEAN nations along
with representatives of seven other nations in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 . At the meeting,
Japan's Foreign Minister proposed the establishment of an annual forum on regional security
matters. [Ref. 109: p. 14] In January 1993, then Prime Minister Miyazawa visited Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Brunei. Again he emphasized Japan's intention to play a more active,
and constructive role in promoting regional security. He called for new thinking
...about how we should shape cooperation between Japan and ASEAN
countries with the future ofthe Asia-Pacific in mind, and about the role Japan
should play in this regard. [Ref 122]
Miyazawa also attempted to quiet Southeast Asian fears about a resurgence of
Japanese power in the region in the wake of the United States withdrawal from the
Philippines, and the historic deployment of Japanese peacekeepers to Cambodia in the
Summer of 1992. [Ref. 123] To demonstrate that they are not intent on filling power vacuums
in the region, the Japanese have consistently supported America's continued engagement in
Southeast Asia. Japan has also avoided Southeast Asian initiatives that seek to exclude the
United States economically. For several years, Japan has shown ambivalence towards
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir's proposal to form an East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC) that would exclude the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. They have
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avoided giving a clear response to this plan that would give Japan a strong leadership
position, despite their desires to become even more involved in the region's economic
development.
The United States has made it clear that it opposes such groupings on the grounds
that it could lead to an exclusive ASEAN trading bloc. In April 1995, Japan declined to
attend an annual meeting of the ASEAN economic ministers (AEM) held in Phuket, Thailand.
Knowing that the formation of the EAEC would be a main topic of discussion, it insisted that
Australia and New Zealand be invited to attend before it agreed to participate in the meeting.
[Ref 124] The Malaysian press criticized Japan for "going all out to please the United States"
which, according to it, has been an "overbearing" advocate of APEC. [Ref. 125] Another
reason that Japan turned down this latest ASEAN invitation could have been that it did not
want the 1995 APEC conference in Tokyo to be upstaged by any subregional economic
developments. In response to Japan's refusal to participate in the AEM meeting, Prime
Minister Mahatir snubbed a visiting Keidanren delegation led by its Chairman, Toyoda
Shoichiro. Toyoda later said:
The United States and Asia are both important for Japan. I consider the
EAEC concept a proposal within the APEC framework, and the EAEC and
APEC have the same goal. [Ref. 126]
Suzuki Kazumasa, the Managing Director of Mitsui Corporation, is more emphatic in his
support of Japan's involvement in the EAEC. According to him, "the entire ASEAN would
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stand against Japan if Japan opposes the EAEC." [Ref. 126] Japanese business sees the
EAEC as a wonderful opportunity to expand its penetration of regional markets.
Although the Japanese government still clearly wants to avoid the impression that it
supports a Japan-led trading bloc, it is less reluctant to use ASEAN fora to exercise leadership
on security issues. In preparation for the ARF meeting in Brunei on August 1, 1995, Japanese
Foreign Minister Kono and his Philippine counterpart, Domingo Siazon, rallied support
among East Asian nations for a concerted condemnation of France's plans to resume nuclear
testing in the Pacific Ocean. [Ref 127]
During a visit to Tokyo by Vietnam's General Secretary Do Muoi, Japan not only
extended $800 million in aid to Vietnam, but it also announced its whole-hearted support of
Vietnam' entry into ASEAN. [Ref. 128] This was Japan's message to China signaling its
endorsement ofASEAN efforts to seek a peaceful resolution of the Spratly Island's dispute.
It was also a clear demonstration of Japan's strategic interests in the area.
The Director of Japan's Defense Research Institute, Nishihara Masashi, gave an even
more direct statement of Japan's concerns about China's intentions in the region. He was
quoted by The International Herald Tribune in April 1995:
We are concerned about China's creeping irredentism and expansionism. The
South China Sea is a very important trade route for us, not only with
Southeast Asia, but with the Middle East and Europe. About 75 percent of
Japan's oil imports pass through this sea, as does much inter-Asian trade. [Ref.
128]
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The Chinese naval exercise and surface-to-surface missile firings scheduled to take
place just north of Taiwan a week before the ASEAN meeting in Brunei in August 1995
served as a reminder of China's determination to defend its interests in the Spratlys, as well
as its intention of enforcing its "one-China" policy.
Even though ASEAN states are most concerned about China's regional ambitions,
many are still wary of Japan's future intentions. In a paper presented to a conference of the
ASEAN Defense Technology Exchange in April 1995, Malaysian Undersecretary of Defense
Abod predicted that Japan would soon develop "comprehensive military power, including
nuclear capability." She went on to say that:
Geopolitics and Japan's past record of militarism and aggression suggest a
Japan armed to the teeth will be a grave security threat to Southeast Asia.
[Ref. 130]
In order to advance its current Asian policies, Japanese leaders have made efforts to
express some form of apology for Imperial Japan's behavior during World War II. However,
many Southeast Asians believe the comments ofpeople like Okuno Seisuke, a former Minister
ofJustice, are more representative of Japan's true feelings. He said, "we fought the war on
Asian territory but we never fought against Asians." [Ref. 121] In the near term, Japan's
economic relationship with Southeast Asia will continue to be its primary avenue of influence
in the region. It will have to open its markets to goods from Southeast Asia in order to
redress its large trade surplus with the region. However, its massive direct investment in
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ASEAN economies (over $3 billion in 1992) will give it a large stake in the region's future.
[Ref. 13123]
E. THE RUSSIA FACTOR
Japan's relations with Russia have shown the least progress over the last five years
when compared to its ties with its other Asian neighbors. The two countries have yet to
conclude a peace treaty with each other that would officially end the hostilities that began in
1945. Improvement in their relations is blocked by the impasse over the Northern territories
(Southern Kurils) dispute.
During Foreign Minister Kozyrev's visit to Tokyo in March of 1995, no progress was
made in solving the territorial dispute over the four islands off the coast of Hokkaido. In fact,
the Russians seemed to be reversing their policy of demilitarizing the islands. Reports from
Moscow indicated that the Russians planned to increase the number of border guards
stationed on the islands from current level of 4,000 to 10,000. [Ref. 132] When Foreign
Minister Kono commented on this new development, Kozyrev replied that Moscow would
send a group of experts to Tokyo in order to "explain the difficult aspects" of demilitarizing
the disputed islands. [Ref. 133] The Nihon Kezai Shimbun identified an agreement to begin
negotiations on fishing rights as the only beneficial result of the recent talks. [Ref. 134]
The Japanese believe that a resolution ofthe dispute in the near term is unlikely, given
Yeltsin's waning political strength and the fractured nature ofdomestic politics in Russia. The
Russian focus on its problems in Chechnya and the "near abroad," along with its domestic
economic difficulties, put the Northern Territories issue low on Moscow's agenda.
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A month before Kozyrev's visit to Tokyo, Prime Minister Murayama called on Russia
to resolve the territorial dispute under the "principles of law and justice" as stipulated in the
joint statement issued in October 1993 by then Prime Minister Hosokawa and President
Yeltsin. [Ref 135] Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo in the Fall of 1993 had produced some Japanese
optimism regarding the dispute. The whole tone of his visit was upbeat with over sixteen
bilateral documents being signed including joint statements on North Korea's nuclear
weapon's program, Cambodia, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and economic
cooperation. [Ref. 136] Yeltsin also made a very explicit apology for the detention of
600,000 Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia following World War II, and the subsequent
death of 60,000 of them. [Ref. 137] (This televised address in which Yeltsin made a deep
bow signifying Russia's remorse made a favorable impression on the NHK commentators.)
The joint declaration issued on the final days of his visit included what Japan's Foreign
Ministry considered to be significant progress on the territorial dispute. Russian agreement
to abide by the 1956 Japan - Soviet Joint Declaration, which promised the immediate return
of the two smaller islands (Habomai, and Shikotan) as soon as a peace treaty is signed
between the two countries, was viewed as an important first step in resolving the issue.
Because the declaration also promised to settle the dispute based on "historical and legal
facts" and on the "principles of law and justice," the Japanese government believed a new
framework had been established to end the dispute.
However, Yeltsin's own government was sending mixed signals on its willingness to
resolve the territorial dispute. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and Deputy Prime Minister
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Shumeiko told leaders in the Russian Far East that the islands belonged to Russia and that
their transfer to Japan was not on the agenda. [Ref. 72: p. 104] Following his strong showing
in Russian parliamentary elections in December 1993, ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhironovsky
declared that there would be no ceding of Russian territory; and that there was no territorial
dispute between Japan and Russia. [Ref. 138] The Speaker of the Duma, Ivan Rybkin
proposed that the islands should remain Russian, and be turned into a special economic zone.
[Ref. 78: p. 105] In April of 1995, Rybkin said that the dispute was not a bilateral one since
it involved all the signatory nations ofthe San Francisco Peace Treaty. [Ref. 139] Japan gave
up sovereignty to the Kuril Islands when it signed the treaty. However, the Japanese point out
that Russia's predecessor, the Soviet Union, did not sign the treaty. Furthermore, it maintains
that the four disputed islands are not part of the Kuril chain.
The Japanese government is no longer hopeful that economic incentives will cause
Russia to compromise on the territorial dispute. During Kozyrev's trip to Tokyo in March
1995, neither Murayama or Kono seemed willing to discuss Kozyrev's proposals for Russo-
Japanese cooperation on bilateral trade or other economic issues. Japan is now resigned to
the fact that there will be no short term solution to the territorial issue. Yegor Gayder, the
former First Deputy Premier and current leader of the liberal Democratic Choice Party,
confirmed this view in April 1995 when he met with Foreign Minister Kono. He stated that
there would be no positive moves in the near future regarding Russo-Japanese relations. [Ref.
140] The Russian parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1995 will prevent the
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current Russian government from producing any bold initiatives vis-a-vis Japan in the next
few months.
1. Russo-Japanese Security Cooperation
From January 3 1 until February 2, 1994, the first Trilateral Forum on North Pacific
Security was held in Tokyo. Senior defense, and foreign affairs officials along with respected
strategic analysts from academia and the private sector came from Japan, Russia, and the
United States in order to discuss international security issues. Session one dealt with the
problems involved in adjusting to the end of the Cold War, and included discussions on the
changing nature of security, and regional military developments. The next session covered
nuclear proliferation problems in Asia, and efforts to promote cooperative security ties. The
final session that began on February 2, 1994, specifically addressed how to produce
"mechanisms of cooperation" like improved bilateral ties, and the implementation of
confidence-building measures. The forum marked the beginning of a real security dialogue
between Japan and Russia.
In September of 1993, Japan sent a group of military experts to Moscow in order to
discuss defense issues. This was the first time the two countries held bilateral consultations
on such issues in the post-war period. [Ref 141] The Director of the Defense Agency's
Defense Research Institute, Hironaka Yuken, headed the delegation. The Japanese side
presented a report entitled "The Framework of Regional Security," while Russian officials
proposed confidence-building measures between the two countries. [Ref. 142]
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In the Fall of 1994, the Russian and Japanese held their first combined naval exercise
in the Sea of Japan. The exercise was a rescue-at-sea operation that involved several ships
and aircraft from both countries. However, recurring maritime incidents between Russian
coast guard vessels, and Japanese fishermen operating in the Northern Territories spoiled the
cooperative atmosphere between the two countries. In August 1994, a Japanese fisherman
was shot by a Russian patrol boat near the disputed Kuril Islands. This prompted a heated
diplomatic exchange between the two countries. [Ref 143] Following the incident, Japan's
Maritime Safety Agency cooperated with the Russian coast guard in order to prevent
Japanese fishing vessels from entering the disputed waters. In the past, Japan's government
did little to discourage Japanese fishermen from entering the water off of the Southern Kurils.
Some analysts believe that the Japanese government had previously given Japan's fishermen
tacit approval to enter those waters in order to draw attention to Japanese claims. For several
years Japanese fishermen have rendezvoused with Russian fishermen off of the Kuril Islands
in order to buy the Russian catch directly. The Russian Far Eastern government frowns on
this activity because it prevents their taxation of these exports.
During Yeltsin's visit in 1993, the two countries did sign an agreement to work
together in stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Russians have
been supportive of multilateral efforts to prevent the North Korea from acquiring nuclear
weapons. However, Kozyrev's proposal that Russian reactor technology be provided to
North Korea instead of a South Korean design in order to overcome an impasse in the
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implementation of the Framework Agreement was rejected by the United States, Japan, and
South Korea. [Ref. 144]
2. Other Bilateral Issues
The Russo-Japanese economic relationship has only seen minimal improvements in
the last few years. Bilateral trade between the two countries only amounted to about $2.4
billion in 1993 because of Russia's continuing economic difficulties, its lack of infrastructure
and trade legislation, as well as its confusing administrative practices. [Ref. 78: p. 106]
In the Fall of 1993, the Japanese press reported on Russian dumping of radioactive
waste in the Sea ofJapan. Although the Japanese government had been aware that the Soviet
Union had been engaged in this form of environmental pollution in East Asia for years, when
video images ofRussian ships dumping radioactive waste were played on Japanese television
the government was forced to confront Russia on the matter. Japan has since constructed a
liquid nuclear waste processing facility near Vladivostok in order to prevent future dumping.
Unofficial contact between the Japanese and Russian people has increased in recent
years. Russian businessmen and tourists are frequently seen in Hokkaido port cities like
Nemuro, as well as Tokyo. Former Japanese residents of the Southern Kurils have been
allowed to visit their ancestors' graves (hakamairi) on the islands — a significant familial duty
for the Japanese. Local governments in Hokkaido have provided aid in the form of fuel and
food to the Russian residents of the Kurils during the past several years.
However, many Japanese continue to view Russia as a threat to its security in the long
term. Russian ballistic missile and cruise missile capable submarines continue to patrol the
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Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk. Russian intelligence collection aircraft also routinely
operate near Japan. On March 23, 1995, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a sharp
protest over a Russian Mig-31's violation of Japanese airspace near Rebun Island off of
Hokkaido. [Ref. 145] The Russians, like the Chinese, are worried about American plans to
involve Japan in its TMD project.




A. CURRENT STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES STRATEGY
Current American plans to defend its national security interests are based upon a
document published by the Clinton Administration in July 1994. A National Security Strategy
of Engagement and Enlargement articulates three central goals: maintain credible, battle-
ready military forces, enhance America's economy, and promote democracy abroad. [Ref
138]
The document reflects the difficulty the United States has had in coming to grips with
the cornucopia of new, if less critical, security imperatives that followed the end of the Cold
War. It recognizes that America's economic vitality is key to ensuring the continued strength
of its military forces, and global influence. However, transnational issues like weapons
proliferation, environmental degradation, rapid population growth in some countries, and
ethnic conflict are listed as potentially serious threats to United States security that will
require increased multilateral cooperation as well as United States leadership.
Despite the subtle emphasis on domestic economic security, the Strategy states that
the United States must continue its robust deployment, and overseas stationing of American
forces. These United States commitments are credited with the prevention of dangerous arms
races, and the promotion of regional stability. In fact, the presence of United States forces
overseas is seen as essential to the success ofboth bilateral and multilateral security initiatives,
101
and America's integration with critically important foreign markets. The Strategy still sees
America as the world's primary provider of leadership in security affairs.
The United States federal budget deficit is named as a threat to America's
competitiveness in world markets, and thus its economic security. Along with a reduction in
this deficit, efforts at stronger government and business cooperation in R&D, and export
promotion are prescribed. In order to improve the performance of United States business
overseas, the United States will continue to expand the purview of multilateral trade
arrangements like NAFTA and APEC. At the same time, it intends to pursue bilateral efforts
at opening markets such as the United States - Japan Framework for Economic Partnership,
and the recent agreements to open the Japanese car market to United States models.
Clinton's strategy includes a whole-hearted endorsement of democratic peace theory.
The clearly stated, long-term goal of the United States is achieving a "world in which each
of the major powers is democratic." The prescription given for attaining this objective is
vague enough to allow policy makers some leeway in interpreting when this goal should have
overriding importance. However, it does commit the United States to taking "immediate
public positions" on the anti-democratic trends in some countries, rather than relying on quiet
diplomacy to pressure such foreign governments to democratize. While the Strategy
emphasizes that this policy is not a democratic crusade, its overseas promotion of "our best
national values" undoubtedly will seem righteous to many Asian states.
In February of 1995, the United States spelled out its specific security goals for Asia
in United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (EASR). [Ref 147]
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Largely the work offormer Assistant Secretary ofDefense Joseph S. Nye, Jr., this publication
is consistent with the objectives expressed in Clinton's Strategy
. However, it reverses the
United States plans for phased troop withdrawals from Asia that were announced in the
Department of Defense's East Asian Security Initiative reports of 1990 and 1992. In the
EASR the United States makes the commitment to maintain a "stable forward presence in the
region, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops for the foreseeable future". The policy
reversal was made in order to allow the United States to respond effectively to regional
disputes, and global security contingencies. However, judging from the tenor of the report,
maintaining the current United States force level is really meant to send a message of
America's intention remain deeply engaged with its allies and friends in the region.
According to the EASR. the three pillars of America's security strategy in Asia are:
its bilateral alliances (particularly with Japan, the ROK, and Australia), United States forward
military presence, and participation in multilateral dialogues.
Out of all the alliances, the United States - Japan relationship is named as the
"linchpin" of United States security policy in Asia. The United States believes that most of
the region's other nations view the United States Japan security relationship as a major factor
in ensuring regional stability. There are two assumptions that underlie this assessment. First,
the United States forces in Japan are a deterrent against military adventurism by major powers
in the region. Secondly, a strong United States - Japan military relationship precludes
substantial Japanese rearmament, and the perceived threats that this possibility would pose
to its neighbors. In an article in Foreign Affairs written in defense of the EASR, Nye
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diplomatically handles what is essentially an argument for containing an emerging Japan. He
states that Japanese security analysts who have looked at the prospects of Japan becoming
a "normal country" with an independent military capability have determined that it would be
enormously expensive "if Japan had to respond // its neighbors reacted (to Japan's
rearmament) by building up their armaments." [Ref. 148] This line of reasoning does not
square neatly with the concept of democratic peace, one of the main premises of Clinton's
Strategy . That is to say, if one believes in the precepts of democratic peace theory, then a
democratic country like Japan that is capable ofdefending itself should not appear threatening
to its neighbors — especially the ones with fledgling democracies like South Korea and
Russia.
Another reason given by the EASR for strengthening the United States - Japan
security relationship is that it allows the two countries to work together more closely on the
achievement of mutual global objectives that are based on a common set of values. These
objectives include humanitarian reliefto the world's troubled spots, and support for emerging
democracies. Finally, the United States sees the financial support provided by Japan's host
nation support (which is about $5 billion per year), its purchases of large amounts of United
States military equipment, and the potential transfers of Japanese dual-use technology as
supporting United States global strategy. The JSDF's ability to defend important sea lanes,
limited though it may be, is also viewed as an asset that contributes to regional security.
The rationale given for the continued forward presence of the United States military
in Asia is based on several considerations. This practice supports the U.S.'s ability to respond
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to distant crises quickly, deters regional aggressors, and enhances American ability to
influence other important issues in Asia. Regarding this last point, Nye argues that there are
incalculable benefits that accrue to the United States from being militarily engaged in the
region. Such a presence gives the United States a say on other non-military issues that affect
its interests — particularly economic concerns. Nye cites the reluctance of many Asian
countries to join an EAEC that excluded the United States as evidence of Asian concerns
about losing continued American security guarantees. [Ref. 148: p. 100] Japanese concerns
about the impact of United States - Japan trade disputes on the security relationship and on
United States military presence there have been credited with their capitulation to some
American demands regarding trade.
The participation of the United States in multilateral security dialogues, the third
pillar of the EASR. is considered to be a supplement to the bilateral alliance system; and a
means to promote confidence-building measures, and transparency in the military intentions
of regional powers. The United States views the weakness of multilateral institutions in East
Asia as a factor that supports the argument for assertive American leadership in the Asia-
Pacific region.
In order to accomplish the "enlargement" of Clinton's Strategy , the EASR, makes it
clear that America intends to expand its bilateral security dialogue with its former enemies —
China, Russia, and Vietnam. China is the focus of much of America's strategic calculations
for the future of East Asia. In a paper submitted to a conference that was co-sponsored by
the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and the Pacific forum CSIS, Nye outlined the
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United States strategy of comprehensive engagement with China that is designed to achieve
"mutual understanding as well as greater transparency and trust." [Ref. 149: p. 7]
The United States does not currently consider China as an adversary, but the steady
growth of its military power and influence must be taken into account. In an interview
conducted by the Los Angeles Times . Mr. Nye said:
If you treat China as an enemy China will become an enemy. If you have a
policy of containment toward China now you've written off the chance [that
China won't become an enemy]. It may be a 50-50 chance, so why write off
the 50%. [Ref. 150]
The Director ofthe Defense Intelligence Agency, General James Clapper, listed North
Korea's military posture, and future military developments in China as the DOD's primary
security concerns in Asia when he gave his assessment of worldwide threats to the Senate
Armed Services Committee in January 1995. [Ref. 151] The EASR points to the successful
implementation of the Framework Agreement with North Korea as being part of a process
that will ease tensions over the nuclear issue. Again, the continued presence of United States
troops in South Korea is viewed as an insurance policy that promotes a peaceful resolution
of tensions on the peninsula.
In summary, in the view of the current Administration, the ending of the Cold War has
left the United States as the only global power capable of ensuring the continued stability of
the East Asian security environment. United States responsibilities in the region have only
increased.
106
B. CURRENT STATEMENT OF JAPANESE STRATEGY
For several years now Japan has been edging towards a more independent role in the
management of its security affairs. The events of the Gulf War along with a scaled back
United States military presence in Asia were a kind of wake-up call for Japanese leaders to
think more seriously about their external security.
It was the debate within Japan caused by its need to respond to the Gulf crisis that
really enlivened Japanese thinking about its place in the world. Some argued that Japan
should remain aloof from such conflicts and continue to rely on "check book" diplomacy.
Others argued that Japan should accept more of the burden of maintaining international
security; but they often disagreed on whether this should include the dispatch ofJSDF forces
in either a supporting or peacekeeping role.
In order to pave the way for Japanese participation in future peacekeeping efforts,
Prime Minister Kaifu's government introduced legislation in 1991 that would permit up to two
thousand JSDF members to be sent abroad for U.N. -sponsored peacekeeping missions.
However, it was not until the Summer of 1992 after tortuous debate in the Diet (and attempts
by opposition party members to slow the voting process by performing the "ox walk" as they
shuffled to the ballot box) that a new prime minister, Miyazawa, was able to gain passage of
the Peacekeeping Operations Bill. Shortly thereafter Japan sent a 600-man contingent from
the JSDF to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations on Cambodia. To date, JSDF forces
have been involved in U.N. operations in Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zaire.
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In February of 1992 a "Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International
Community" chaired by former LDP Secretary General Ozawa issued a draft report. The
report listed four principles for Japan's new international role:
1
.
Maintain close ties with the U. S.
2. Help to strengthen the leadership role of the G-7.
3. Actively take part in UN. security functions.
4. Actively confer with other Asian countries in order to preserve peace and
maintain stability in the region. [Ref 1 52]
The draft report also recommended that the interpretation of the Japanese
Constitution be reconsidered so that Japan could pursue an active pacifism that would allow
it to use force in helping to maintain or restore international peace. [Ref. 152: pp. 53-54]
As can be seen from the draft report, Japanese leaders were careful to fit their plans
for a more activist foreign policy within the context of multilateral bodies like the U.N. and
G-7, as well as increased bilateral cooperation with their Asian neighbors. It became
increasingly apparent that Japan's bilateral ties with the United States were less important in
their own right, but continued to be relevant as a badge of representing Japan's commitment
to international stability as it expanded its political influence in Asia.
The Defense Agency's White Paper for 1993 stressed the importance of establishing
a dialogue among Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the Southeast Asian nations. It cited the
February 1993 visit of a Russian military delegation to Tokyo as the kind of direct dialogue
that promotes peace and stability in the region. [Ref. 153]
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The debate within Japan on whether the Constitution needed to be amended heated
up in 1993. Some analysts argued that a reinterpretation was all that was necessary. They
asserted that an amendment made in 1946 by Ashida Hitoshi to the war-renouncing Article
IX of the original draft prepared by MacArthur's staff gave policy makers some leeway. In
their way of thinking, Article IX could be interpreted to mean that Japan renounced war as
a sovereign right in the settlement of its disputes with other countries, but not in defending
itself against an invader, or in cooperation with UN. peacekeeping efforts. [Ref. 154]
Meanwhile, public support for amending the Constitution also seemed to be climbing. A poll
conducted by the Yomiuri Shinbum found that 50 percent of Japanese supported amending
the Constitution, and 33 percent were opposed in 1993 — compared with 33 percent in favor,
and 51 percent opposed in 1991. [Ref. 155] In December of 1993 the Director of the
Defense Agency, Nakanishi Keisuke, was forced to resign when he advocated a constitutional
amendment that would allow the JSDF to play a more active role in UN. sponsored
peacekeeping operations. Nakanishi, an ally of Ozawa and a longtime advocate of giving
Japanese peacekeepers combatant duties, said "it is no good to stick to the Constitution,
which was drafted fifty years ago." [Ref. 156]
During 1994 Japan continued to indicate its willingness to play a more active role in
international security affairs, and in shaping a new world order. It stepped up its diplomatic
drive to get a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. It continued trying to reassure
neighboring countries of its remorse about the past, and of its peaceful intentions.
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The defense posture of Japan exhibited the signs of a long overdue change. The
Defense Agency's White Paper for 1994 devoted much less space to the analysis of the
Russian military. [Ref 157] Instead, it concentrated on the threats of nuclear proliferation
in the region posed by North Korea. [Ref. 157: pp. 36-42] The Far Eastern Economic
Review quoted a Western diplomat who said that "it means the Cold War is over at defense
headquarters and the new realities of regional instability are starting to percolate." [Ref. 158]
This new outlook had been advocated by Maritime SelfDefense Force leaders, who, like their
Imperial Navy predecessors, are generally more attuned to the international security climate
than their counterparts in the Ground SelfDefense Force (GSDF). (The GSDF had opposed
a shift of attention away from the Russian threat because it would mean a reduction in their
allotted troop strength).
In February of 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro appointed a special advisory
panel to review Japan's long-term defense policy. The panel was made up of senior
representatives from the business world (the Chairman of the panel was the director of the
Asahi Breweries, Ltd., Mr. Higuchi Hitaro, who is also head of a family long associated with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA]), retired officials from the Defense Agency and
MOFA, as well as experts in strategic affairs from Japanese academe. [Ref. 159] The
conclusions reached by the Higuchi Commission will play a large part in the restructuring of
the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). For the past two decades the NDPO
has provided the basis for Japan's defense planning, and as a result, it has had a great impact
on the United States - Japan security relationship. The 1976 NDPO conceptualized a
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standard Japanese defense force that would be capable of dealing with limited or small-scale
aggression [Ref 160]. It was written in a period of detente between the major powers would
continue to produce stability. However, the document was flexible enough to allow defense
planners some latitude in interpreting it as a basis for military procurement. [Ref. 160: p. 21]
The Higuchi Commission issued its report, The Modality of Security and Defense
Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century , in August 1994. Their report noted
that with the Cold War over and the superpower's influence diminished, power relationships
have become much more fluid in Asia. Therefore, it gave pride of place to Japan's need to
expand its efforts at multilateral cooperation. Secondly, it recognized the need to maintain
the bilateral defense relationship with the United States as a means to make multilateral
cooperation more effective. Finally, the report emphasized the need to improve Japan's
indigenous defensive capability:
The ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a people to
defend themselves and in holding the appropriate means of doing so... Self-
defense capability is a concrete expression of a nation's capability of self
management and of crisis management. [Ref. 159: p. 35]
The need to improve the government's ability to respond to crises effectively was
named as the primary security priority. While Japan has a National Security Council
(consisting of the prime minister, the Ministers of foreign affairs and finance, the chief cabinet
secretary, the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, and directors general of
the Defense Agency and the Economic Planning Agency) it has been a ritualistic conference
designed to give authority to conclusions reached in advance by the separate ministries. It
cannot deal with emergencies on its own. To illustrate the point, the Security Council did not
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meet until hostilities actually began between the Coalition Forces and Iraq during the Gulf
War. [Ref. 161]
The Higuchi Commission's emphasis on a multilateral agenda is intended to take
advantage of what it views as an historic opportunity to expand arms control efforts, and
support the security dialogues already underway in ARF and the Council for Security
Cooperation in Asia-Pacific. Patrick Cronin views the slant towards multilateralism as Japan's
way ofhedging against waning United States commitments to the mutual defense relationship,
and as a way for Japan to channel its political and financial resources away from bilateral
defense cooperation. [Ref. 159: p. 9]
And yet, the report asserts that international cooperation centered on the United
States and augmented by NATO in Europe, and the United States - Japan Security Treaty in
Asia provide the framework for the post-Cold War security system.
In order to improve the United States - Japan security relationship the commission
recommends that interoperability between the two militaries be improved in the areas of
operations and intelligence. In order to provide better mutual logistic support, it specifically
advocates the establishment ofan acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) between
the two countries like the one between the United States and NATO members.
The commission wants to reshape the JSDF to meet the threats of the future. This
will require a reorientation away from old, Cold War force structures. In their view the most
likely dangers to Japan's security in the current international environment are weapons
proliferation, and localized military conflicts that will often be induced by economic poverty
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and social discontent. Therefore, Japan should be prepared to respond to crises with the
appropriate measures — be it economic aid or peacekeeping forces.
The measures they recommend for reshaping the JSDF for the 21st century will make
it more effective for peacekeeping, and disaster relief missions, but will also make it more self-




Augmented intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, along with improved
early warning and surveillance systems;
2. Strengthened joint operational capability among the three services;
3 Improved maneuverability and combat readiness;
4. A reduction in the authorized force levels from the present level of about 274,000
to about 240,000 (which is close to the current manning levels of the services);
5. Develop systems that can deal with ballistic missiles (TMD);
6. Maintain the United States nuclear umbrella over Japan,
7. Maintain defense technology at an advanced level; and
8. Maintain autonomy and independence in equipment procurement and defense-
related technology. [Ref 159: pp. 48-55]
With an executive adviser to Keidanren (the Federation ofEconomic Organizations)
on the commission the plight of Japan's defense industry was not ignored. In some areas,
Japanese defense procurement is about half of what it was in the late 1980s. [Ref. 162] The
commission realizes that the government needs to maintain domestic production in arms if it
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wants to become a more self-sufficient nation. They believe that joint research and
development should be conducted with the United States and other nations.
Finally, its recommendations for an improved intelligence capability suggests an
expansion in governmental collection efforts — both technical and human. Japan's space
program has already developed a launch vehicle that could place intelligence satellites into
orbit. More importantly, the need to make Japan's intelligence bureaucracy more responsive
to political leaders is required. Some efforts have been made on this front since the Gulf War,
but bureaucratic inefficiencies still exist.
Minister ofForeign Affairs, Kono Yohei, outlined Japan's intentions to become more
proactive in international security affairs during a speech given to the U.N. General Assembly
in September 1994. [Ref. 163] He stressed Japan's commitment to increase its contribution
to U.N. efforts to solve global economic and social problems. Like the Fiighuchi
Commission, he identified weapons proliferation, and subregional conflicts as the greatest
dangers to world security; and reiterated Japan's decision to become more involved in PKO
missions. Finally, he urged the U.N. to grant Japan a seat on the U.N. Security Council as
soon as possible, and to delete the so-called "former enemy clauses" from the U.N. Charter.
[Ref. 163]
In his speech to the 132nd session of the Diet in January 1995, Prime Minister
Murayama echoed the recent calls of other Japanese politicians when he expressed Japan's
need to intensify its economic and political contacts with other nations in the region. He
stressed the importance of expanding Japan's involvement in multilateral fora like ARF and
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APEC. [Ref. 164] Only after describing the importance of enhancing Japan's inter-Asian ties
did he mention the bilateral relationship with the United States.
Japan clearly believes its future economic and political success will depend more on
its ability to encourage development and peace in Asia. It is also trying to move its global
foreign policy from a United States - centered basis to one that revolves around a more
powerful U.N. Japan's determination to become more self-reliant militarily is also an
indication of its doubts about the U.S.'s ability to retain its current level of influence in the
region.
C. RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES
The arguments being made in support of strengthening or maintaining the current
nature of the U.S.- Japan Security relationship are based upon United States policy goals that
seek to ensure American leadership in world political affairs, and Japanese security objectives
that seek to avoid the expense of increased defense spending, and perceptions that Japan may
pose a military threat to their neighbors. Advocates of the Mutual Security Treaty as it
currently configured are loathe to change a bilateral regime that has served the interests of
both countries so well over the last four decades. They view the current international arena
as being fraught with uncertainty, and full of potentially destabilizing threats. Nascent
multilateral security fora in Asia are, in their view, not able to meet the challenge of quickly
and decisively handling crisis that may erupt in the region. They maintain that only the close
cooperation forged in a tight United States - Japan bilateral security relationship can provide
the means to contain and prevent regional crises.
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In a paper written for the United States Naval War College, Janvier Smith asserts that
the United States - Japan security relationship is "strong and will continue to remain so." [Ref.
165] She argues that the U.S.' s forward basing of military forces is necessary to support its
global strategy, and to aid other regional powers that have endorsed continued military
presence in Asia. These are the two main rationales for maintaining the bilateral relationship
in it current form. She describes the United States as the region's only "honest broker" that
can act as a go-between in solving inter-Asian disputes. [Ref. 165]
In January 1995, at a conference of Japanese and American security analysts chaired
by Sato Seizaburo, and Jerome Kahan concluded that the United States - Japan alliance
should be enhanced as the basis for regional stability. [Ref. 1 66] America was urged to send
a clear message about its willingness to maintain its current level of military engagement in
the area, and it recommended that Japan have expanded rights and responsibilities in the
maintenance of regional security. [Ref. 166: pp. 22-39] Multilateral security dialogues were
viewed by the group as a promising means to promote peace in the region, and as an
opportunity for Japan to become more active in regional affairs. However, the participants
did agree that collective security regimes for the Asia-Pacific were currently unworkable.
[Ref. 166: pp. 22-39]
Underlying these arguments is a basic distrust of Japan's ability to act responsibly and
competently in managing its own security affairs without direct United States guidance.
Another major concern stated by both Japanese and American policy makers who support the
status quo in their bilateral relations is what might happen in the region, and within Japan if
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the nuclear umbrella were withdrawn from Japan. The assumption is that the continued
presence of United States troops in Japan provides a permanent solution to both perceived
problems.
In his book Blueprint for a New Japan . Ozawa Ichiro also reaffirms the continued
relevance of the United States - Japan security relationship [Ref. 167]. However, his
approach is more forward looking than the two previous examples. He supports continued
security cooperation with the United States as long as its policies are laying the groundwork
for a U.N. -centered world order. Ozawa believes that Japan must play an activist role in
world security matters: "we must make the leap from our passive 'exclusive defense strategy'
to a dynamic 'peace building strategy.' " [Ref. 167: p. 107] He advocates a restructuring of
the JSDF away from its Cold War roles as a subordinate part of United States military
strategy to an organization with the training and equipment necessary to conduct both military
and non-military peace-building missions. [Ref. 167: p. 108]
Ozawa's vision of a new "normal" Japan is one that its neighbors will no longer fear,
and one that will be far more responsible for its own defense. He deals with the issue
regarding Japan's need for a nuclear umbrella by proposing a U.N. -controlled strategic force
to deter attacks on non-nuclear states.
Those analysts and politicians who advocate a loosening or substantial modification
of security ties between the United States and Japan point to apparent trends toward
increased regional economic interdependence, reduced military tensions between former
adversaries, the need for Japan to conduct its affairs more independently of the United States,
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and America's relative economic decline as evidence of the need for change. They tend to be
more optimistic about the multilateral opportunities to solve the security problems that
threaten to cause conflict in Asia.
Domestic attitudes within both countries towards the security relationship have
reflected the need for modification of its parameters. Americans have been less hesitant to
link economic and traditional security issues. In the latest round of trade negotiations on car
imports, Winston Lord and White House spokesman Mike McCurry made oblique references
to withdrawing the nuclear umbrella from Japan if the Japanese refused to make concessions
on opening its car market. [Ref 168]
While the Japanese share many of the same values that Amercians stand for ~ such
as freedom, democracy, and liberal market economies ~ they often do not agree with the
United States on where these values should lead their country in international affairs. [Ref.
89] They believe that their contributions to global security in the form of ODA, host nation
support, and their financial support for the GulfWar effort have been unappreciated. While
they understand the need for Japan to play a more activist role in world affairs they resent
being pressured by the United States to follow its lead.
Ishihara Shintaro supports a change in the qualitative and quantitative level of security
cooperation with the United States He advocates a drastic reduction in the United States
military presence in Japan, and a return to Japanese control of some of the more important
United States military bases near crowded Tokyo (e.g., Yokota Air Base). [Ref. 169] He
wants to base the security relationship on a more equal and looser footing. Self-defense
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forces would no longer be a component of the United States strategy, but a balanced, non-
threatening force capable of defending Japan, and being actively engaged in PKO missions.
[Ref 1 69] Ishihara would reduce the apprehensions of neighboring countries regarding
Japan's intentions by ensuring complete transparency of Japan's military capabilities, and by
demonstrating Japan's will to support peacekeeping efforts. [Ref. 169]
As part of a change in the security relationship, he advocates closer economic and
political ties with Japan's Asian neighbors. Japan's involvement in the EAEC is seen as a way
to encourage development in the region, and to promote worldwide trade. [Ref. 169]
Ishihara believes that the uncertainty of future threats can be handled on more of a ad
hoc basis with the United States, and other powers, rather than by strengthening ties with the
United States before such problems arise. [Ref. 169] If China proves to have hegemonic
aims can then cooperate to balance such a threat.
Edward Olsen and David Winterford argue that the diversification of power in Asia
(and the rest of the world) will probably force the United States and Japan to choose some
variant of multilateralism in order to manage regional conflicts. So that rising powers might
be steered into a framework of shared leadership that maximizes American leverage on
security issues, the United States should seek to promote the multilateral fora it prefers now.
Olsen and Winterford propose a Pax Condominia
in which nominally co-equal countries and regional clusters of countries would
loosely share access, costs, risks, and responsibility for maintaining a
semblance of world order, and resolving breakdowns as they occur. [Ref.
170: p. 39-40]
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They warn that if America tries too hard to remake Asia in its own image based on
United States interpretations of human rights and democracy, Asian powers may use
multilateral structures to contain American ambitions. [Ref 170: p. 36-37]
Other analysts are more direct in their criticism of the anachronistic structures in the
United States - Japan relationship. Americans are reluctant to give up the appurtenances of
power that they enjoyed during the Cold War despite the dangers posed to their long-term
economic security if old commitments are not reevaluated. The Japanese who are just
beginning to come to terms with the prospects of exercising their substantial power on the
world stage are relatively content to let America guarantee its external security for now.
Chalmers Johnson thinks that the United States and Japan need to reestablish their
relationship based on their economic interdependence, while at the same time recognizing
their different political and ideological agendas. [Ref. 171: p. 322] He believes that
continuing on the course laid down when the Mutual Security Treaty was negotiated will
inevitably produce a serious clash of interests between the two countries.
The Japanese do not share the same ideological view of the new world order as held
by many Americans. Their interests will lead them to different conclusions about the need to
become involved in particular foreign conflicts. They will increasingly resent being subsumed
in the policies ofwhat they view as a declining hegemon. Johnson makes a similar point when
he says:
Japan has never been drawn to alliances with nations in decline. The
Americans would therefore be wise to abandon the term "burden sharing,"
because it both reeks of American self-righteousness and amounts to a self-
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advertisement of America's declining ability to carry out an independent
foreign policy. [Ref 171: p. 307]
These two broadly defined schools of thought on the future course of the United
States - Japan security relationship acknowledge to varying degrees the change that has taken
place in world politics since the late 1980s. And yet, the strategy of continuing or
strengthening bilateral ties forged under radically different circumstances is intended to
harness the political and economic power of an emerging Japan in the service of United States
global objectives. Japanese who support the security relationship in its present form see it as
an opportunity to stay focused on domestic economic security concerns. This approach
ignores many of the economic and political trends within both countries that will make such
an integration of their respective policy goals incompatible. Americans demand increased
financial and technological support form Japan in order to continue its leadership in
international political and military affairs. It will be far more difficult for any Japanese
government to maintain, let alone increase, the level of host nation support, or transfers of
dual-use technology to the United States in this era of increasing economic rivalry and
declining military tensions.
Both nations will sometimes want to conduct their affairs in Asia out of the context
oftheir bilateral security relationship. Allowing both nations a freer hand in determining their
national interests will lead to more meaningful cooperation where those interests converge,
as well as a more straightforward approach to perceived conflicts of interest in the bilateral
relationship.
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A loosening of security ties between the United States and Japan does pose risks as
well as opportunities. Japan may opt for substantial rearmament, and may even acquire
nuclear weapons but it will probably do so as a result of clear and ominous external threats.
The "nuclear allergy" and the anti-militarism among the modern Japanese electorate
precludes a unilaterally aggressive Japan. As the Japanese begin to independently face the
challenges to their interests abroad, they will develop more effective bureaucratic and political
mechanisms for responding to crises, at the same time, Japanese politicians will be forced to
develop the national consensus on what constitutes Japan's vital interests. Since Japan
continued to greatly benefit from the international trade regime, and supports U.N. efforts to




A. THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION
The problems with deepening the level of security cooperation between the United
States and Japan are manifest. The 1996 United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security
fails to address many of these problems. Even when a clear, common threat served as the
basis for their coordinated efforts during the Cold War the Japanese did not view their
security relationship with the United States as a full fledged alliance. During that period,
Japanese policy makers were careful to avoid any increased military commitment, or foreign
policy alignment with the United States that was not absolutely essential to the maintenance
of the relationship. Therefore it was not until the early 1980s that any substantial combined
United States - Japan military exercises were conducted. On the foreign policy front they also
took an independent stance when their interests dictated it. For example, since the 1970s
Japan has pursued an independent foreign policy in the Middle East. The latest example of
the divergent objectives that the two countries have in that region was demonstrated in June
1995 when Japan refused to go along with a United States trade embargo against Iran for its
attempts to acquire nuclear technology, and its sponsorship of international terrorism.
The crisis precipitated by North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT tested the
vitality and relevance of the security relationship in post - Cold War Asia. When the United
States began considering the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea it found
the Japanese reluctant to agree with such an approach. As tensions mounted over the issue
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in late 1993, and early 1994 the United States government began to seek clarification of the
kind of support it could expect from Japan ifU.N.-sponsored sanctions were imposed, and/or
some type of military engagement resulted with North Korea. The Japanese government was
hesitant to give any formal commitments in advance regarding the kind of support it would
offer in the various contingencies. They preferred to wait until sanctions were declared, or
hostilities commenced before they announced their intentions. It remained unclear throughout
the crisis as to what extent the Japanese would allow the United States to use its bases in
Japan to carry out its policies vis-a-vis North Korea. What role the JSDF would play in the
case of sanctions against North Korea, or in the case ofNorth Korean attack against United
States ships was undetermined. However, it was clear that without Japanese cooperation any
economic sanctions against North Korea would be ineffective. With Korean residents in
Japan sending between $1 and $2 billion to North Korea every year Japan is an important
source of hard currency for Kim Jong-Il's government. [Ref 172]
While Japan's commitment to provide funding in support of the Framework
Agreement between the United States and North Korea did help to secure that deal, there was
not the kind of planning, and coordination of policies that one might expect from two
countries that have had a formal security relationship for nearly half a century. If the United
States and Japan could not easily establish consensus, and plans of action on how to face a
perennial foe, one wonders how the two countries would cooperate if a crisis arose from an
unexpected part of the region. One of the arguments repeatedly made in support of
maintaining the United States - Japan security relationship as it currently configured is that
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it provides the mechanism for responding quickly and conceitedly to regional crisis.
Ironically, an arrangement that would give United States forces access to Japanese bases in
certain contingencies instead of permanent basing rights may have produced an even more
coordinated United States - Japan response to the North Korean nuclear issue. One of the
problems faced by Japanese policy makers was the negative domestic reaction they feared if
the United States bases in Japan had been used by America for unilateral sanctions
enforcement, or military strikes against North Korea. IfJapanese leaders had been able to say
the United States military would be given access to Japanese bases in order to enforce
sanctions, it would have been a means of stepping up the pressure on North Korea short of
actually applying those sanctions. At the same time, the Japanese government would be able
to demonstrate to its wary public that it would have some positive control over the
parameters of United States military action originating from Japanese bases.
Another American motive for establishing closer defense cooperation with Japan is
their desire to gain access to Japanese technology. One of the objectives that the United
States government had when it pressured Japan into a co-production arrangement of their
newest fighter aircraft, FS-X, was that some Japanese technology would flow back to the
United States In fact, Congress placed some restrictions on transfers of American aerospace
technology to Japanese manufacturers, while at the same time, insisting that Japanese
technology flow back to the United States under the co-production agreement. [Ref. 173]
When the prototype ofthe FS-X was first introduced in January 1995 the project was already
two years behind schedule, and cost overruns were twice as high as the original projections.
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[Ref. 174] The value of Japanese technology that United States corporations were offered
was of questionable value. Some experts believe that American producers are already ahead
in the two most notable areas in which Japanese technology was transferred — composites,
and phased array radar technology.
As a result of the FS-X co-production project, and the previous United States - Japan
joint production and licensed production projects that included the F-15 and the Boeing-777,
the Japanese aerospace industry is closer to achieving self-sufficiency in aircraft production.
[Ref. 87: pp. 158-161] Even with the restrictions placed on the transfer of United States
technology during the development phase of the FS-X, Japanese firms were able to learn
about Lockheed's computer-aided design methods, as well as other production techniques.
[Ref. 173]
Since the small Japanese defense industry is likely to continue to suffer as orders for
weapons systems decline, it seems unlikely that Japan's government will again be coerced into
allotting a substantial share ofproduction to a foreign producer as occurred in the FS-X case.
In fact, the cost overruns and technical difficulties that may end up producing a fighter that
costs about $100 million a copy (compared to $25-30 million for a comparable United States
fighter) could be blamed on the United States government by those in Japan who support
indigenous production ofweaponry. Originally, MITI and the Defense Agency were pushing
for a domestically produced fighter. Now that Japan's aerospace industry is more capable,
and the results ofthe FS-X project have been so problematic, many of the arguments against
domestic production of such weaponry have been negated.
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While there are incentives for the Japanese government to seek United States
cooperation in producing other weapon systems like ballistic missile defense systems, it may
be difficult for them to produce the technology transfers necessary to induce United States
cooperation. The United States wants access to dual-use technologies like liquid-crystal
displays that are mostly controlled by private industry. Japanese government officials often
point out that they can not simply tell companies to make these technologies available to
United States producers. [Ref 162] As economic competition between the two countries
becomes an even more important aspect of their relationship, the prospects for close
cooperation in the production of high-technology weapons will decrease.
For several years the United States has been soliciting Japanese support for the
production of theater ballistic missile defense systems (TMD). On March 17, 1995, United
States contractors and defense officials and Defense Department officials held a display of one
ofthe TMD system prototypes at Yokota Air Force Base for Japanese government officials,
and defense industry representatives. Despite attempts by United States government
representatives to tone down the hard-sell tactics that have characterized previous United
States overtures to gain Japanese participation in the program, United States contractors
turned the event into a glitzy sales campaign. [Ref. 175] The clear message the United States
has been sending to Japan is "we want your yen and your technology." Even though Japan
acknowledges the number one military threat it faces is ballistic missile attack from North
Korea it has been slow in becoming involved in U.S.-sponsored TMD programs. Many
United States military, and civilian officials expect Japan to eventually support TMD
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initiatives. However, it is apparent that Japan will only do so after carefully considering the
needs of its own defense industry, and the perceptions that its acquisition of such systems will
create in neighboring countries.
Another trend that analysts of the United States - Japan security relationship must
fully appreciate is the declining willingness of politicians on both sides of the Pacific to fund
the costs of maintaining the current level of bilateral military cooperation. United States
requests for more Japanese financial support for the repair costs of warships, and other
expenses were rebuffed in March of 1995. [Ref 176] Other Japanese politicians have hinted
that even the current levels of host-nation support need to be reduced. The Japanese press
has noted the relatively affluent living standards enjoyed by American servicemen in Japan;
and the fact that Japan's government heavily subsidizes their accommodations. In an interview
with the current Director of the Defense Agency, Tamazawa Tokuichiro, political
commentator Imai Hisao pointed out the modest living conditions of JSDF personnel, and
asked why "poor Japan has to squeeze out a 'sympathy budget' for the benefit of Americans
(in Japan), who are living like rich men?" [Ref. 177]
Pressure to return United States bases and facilities to Japanese control (or shared
control) has increased year after year. Although the agreement to return Futenma air base in
Okinawa to Japanese control will help. Japanese citizens will continue to call for the return
of American bases in the crowded Kanto plain. Furthermore, the uses of the bases still in
control of the United States military face mounting restrictions, and limitations. Over the
years the Japanese government has been content to take the long-term view in its drive to
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regain control ofmany of the bases. In some cases its bureaucrats have simply outlasted or
outwitted many American officials in Japan who serve three or four year assignments in the
administration of United States bases there. The dispute about United States live-fire
exercises over Okinawa's "Highway" No. 104 is illustrative of this phenomenon. Originally
the Japanese asked to pave a dirt road through a United States firing range so that it could
be used when gunnery exercises were not being conducted. Once the road was paved, the
Japanese government requested that the United States suspend its live-fire exercises over this
new highway — thereby ending the utility of the firing range.
Requests to open up Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and Yokota Air Base near Tokyo
to civilian use are continually made by Japanese businessmen, and politicians. Opening these
facilities to commercial air freight would ease the congestion at Japan's crowded air hubs, and
bring business into these areas. These requests from commercial interest groups, along with
the complaints about noise levels, and other hazards are getting a more sympathetic reception
from bureaucrats and politicians in Tokyo.
Other events of 1995 revealed less tangible but important demonstrations of the
weaknesses in the United States - Japan security relationship. After the Kobe earthquake in
February the Japanese government exhibited reluctance in accepting American offers of
assistance, despite the desperate need of survivors. Rescue dogs made available by United
States military commanders were refused. [Ref 178] Some offers to ship medical personnel
and supplies were also declined. Eventually tens of thousands of blankets, hundreds of tents
and beds, and other essentials were eventually airlifted into the area by the United States
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military in Japan. One of the leading newspapers in Japan interpreted these United States
relief efforts as being driven by a United States desire to prove the continued relevance of the
United States - Japan security relationship. The Mainichi Shimbun quoted an official from
Japan's Defense Agency who said:
United States Forces Japan (USFJ) came out strong in explaining what they
could do after the quake occurred. I think that they wanted to publicize their
power. [Ref. 179]
In March 1995, Japan experienced an act of domestic terrorism that shook the
country's psyche as much as the Hanshin earthquake did during the previous month. A nerve
gas attack on the Tokyo subway killed ten people and left five thousand injured. A
spokesman for the Aum Shin Ri Kyo cult that is suspected of carrying out the attack said that
he believed the United States military had masterminded the crime. [Ref. 1 80] The cult leader
also claimed that he and his followers had been attacked by more than ten United States
military planes that were spraying nerve gas. [Ref. 1 80] The Japanese government never
issued a statement denying these claims by the cult. Senior United States military and civilian
officials in Japan think that the Japanese government should have echoed the denials ofthe
cult's claims made by United States Embassy and USFJ spokesmen.
Since 1995 also happened to be the 50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War,
there were plenty of occasions that reminded both countries of the bitterness of the struggle
that predated their security relationship. Over the years officials in both countries have
preferred to avoid directly addressing issues like war guilt, and the morality of dropping the
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atomic bombs. As a result, unlike events marking the end of the war in Europe, both Japan
and the United States preferred muted commemorations of their important battles in the
Pacific. For example, Japanese officials insisted upon knowing beforehand the character of
United States plans to commemorate the battle of Iwo Jima. They wanted to know whether
the United States planned to "mourn the war dead or commemorate the victory" before they
approved the ceremony on the island. [Ref. 181]
Japanese reaction to America's Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian was
particularly harsh. Funabashi Yoichi, the Washington correspondent of the Asahi Shimbun,
declared that the atomic bomb is viewed in America as "holy relic," something that United
States politicians dare not criticize. Prime Minister Murayama called the nuclear attacks on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki atrocities when he voiced his criticism of the exhibit. [Ref. 183]
The inability to establish a mutual understanding about these issues along with more
routine failures to reach agreements on port visits for United States warships, certain aspects
of military base usage, and efforts to expand some areas of intelligence sharing are indications
of more fundamental problems in the relationship.
B. REAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Thirty-five years have passed since the last revision of the United States - Japan
Security Treaty. Many officials in both countries have become accustomed to viewing the
international community through the prism of their bilateral relations with each other. As a
result they have overlooked or downplayed the social, economic, and political pressures
within their respective countries that will lead to a modification of the United States - Japan
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security relationship. Needless to say, the international security environment has drastically
changed since 1960. It is true that the profound changes that have occurred in the relations
between Asian states does not mean that the region is completely stable. However, the need
for the current level ofUnited States military presence in Asia must be seriously reappraised.
The primary threat to instability in Northeast Asia is still posed by North Korea.
However, without the military and political support of Russia or China its is highly unlikely
that it will invade a better armed, and more populous South Korea that can count on United
States logistical, and military support. The question is whether the United States needs to
station tens of thousands of United States troops in South Korea or Japan to deter an ever
weaker North Korea. Does it need to maintain ninety-four bases on 78,500 acres of land
[Ref. 184] in a densely populated country like Japan? Base access agreements, and periodic
deployments of United States troops, ships, and aircraft to the region could send the same
message of American commitment to the ultimate defense of South Korea and Japan's
territorial integrity. Both Japan and South Korea are capable of mustering the troop strength
required to defend their lands against the threats that they currently face. American support
should clearly focus on its ability to weigh in with naval and air power, and to provide
supplies of all sorts should the need arise. The inherent flexibility of naval, and air forces
gives the United States the option of deploying these forces rapidly when they are required.
Drastically reducing the number of American personnel stationed in Northeast Asia
would solve a number of the bilateral issues complicating relations with Japan and South
Korea. It would also be consistent with United States vital interests in the region. The
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settlement of base-related problems, and issues regarding the SOFA status of United States
troops in South Korea and Japan would ease much of the domestic political pressure in those
countries to revise their relationship with the United States Furthermore, given the current
level of United States troops in those countries America is in danger ofbecoming involved
in international and internal disputes that do not affect its interests. For the past two
centuries, America's overriding interest in Asia has been preventing the domination of the
region by a hegemonic power, and assuring its commercial access to and through the area.
It has not been especially concerned about what country exercises sovereignty over certain
groups of islands, or other bits of territory. Because of the perceived political leverage that
a substantial United States military presence has given America many South Koreans blame
the United States for the Kwangju massacre in 1980 (in which South Korean troops under
the nominal command of United States Forces Korea killed student protestors); and the
Japanese public has often accused its politicians of sacrificing Japan's interests to preserve
United States military presence there.
Softening the militarily oriented nature of the United States - Japan bilateral security
relationship will help the two countries catch up with developments in the Asian situation.
Policy makers in both countries must readily accept Japan's growing role in shaping and
preserving the security of Asia. Preserving the security relationship in its current form slows
the inevitable process of complete reconciliation and mutual accommodation that Japan must
conclude with its neighbors. The United States and Japan should construct a more balanced
security relationship that gives greater weight to their shared economic and political interests
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circa 1996. Militarily, the United States should continue to facilitate Japan's efforts to
become more involved in PKO missions as USFJ has done during the last several years.
However, the United States should encourage Japan to rely on other nations to meet these
requirements when its is appropriate — as occurred when JSDF peacekeepers were flown
into Zaire by Russian aircraft vice the scheduled United States Air Force C-5.
Japan's efforts at expanded bilateral security dialogues with its neighbors, and nations
from other parts ofthe globe will become more substantial as Washington and Tokyo put less
emphasis on their military ties. Similarly, the necessity of improving multilateral security
mechanisms will become more pressing if Japan loses much of its protectorate status. Since
Japan and many other nations in the region are currently supportive of increased transparency
in military capabilities and intentions, and the implementation of effective confidence-building
measures, the time is right to construct meaningful multilateral security mechanisms.
This does not preclude the United States and Japan from establishing a bilateral
arrangement that can deal with crises in Southeast Asia or other areas of the world. In fact,
a looser, more balanced security relationship in which United States ships and aircraft could
be given access to Japanese bases in order to support certain contingencies in the South China
Sea would be more appropriate in meeting the current threat levels. Under those
circumstances the United States would not only be able to use Japanese bases, but it could
probably also count on the assistance of a more capable JSDF.
Indeed, even some Chinese security experts, who are opposed to the stationing of
United States troops in Japan, acknowledge the utility of United States military presence in
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Southeast Asia. Japan as well as many ofthe ASEAN nations will probably be willing to grant
the United States continued access to ports and airfields in order to ensure the security of that
sub-region, and its important sea lanes.
The United States does not need to station over 45,000 troops in Japan in order to
guarantee that its nuclear umbrella will protect Japan. Even without the presence of United
States troops in Japan, a large number ofAmericans reside in that country. Furthermore, the
economic, and social links between the two countries are profound enough to ensure that
American interests would be affected by the threat of a nuclear attack on Japan.
IfJapan suffered a nuclear attack by a country that could also strike America, United
States leaders would be just as willing to retaliate if its troops were not stationed there. If
Japan came under a nuclear attack by a country that did not possess the capability to launch
such an attack on the United States, American leaders would have a somewhat easier decision
to make regarding retaliation. In either case, much of Japan would be destroyed by even
limited nuclear attacks on the Kanto and Kansai areas. Furthermore, the likelihood that Japan
would be attacked in such a manner by another country is extremely low. The United States
nuclear umbrella can not protect Japan from the most likely user of nuclear weapons in
today's international security environment — terrorists.
The architects of the United States - Japan Security Treaty, Dulles and Yoshida,
would be surprised by the efforts of policymakers in Tokyo and Washington to continue the
security relationship in its present form. At the time, both Japan and the United States
entered into the arrangement due to the imperatives of the emerging Cold War. Dulles was
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adament about the need for Japan to provide for as much of its own defense as possible.
Yoshida never intended for Japan to be a permanent protectorate of the United States.
The goals of the Occupation authorities were to rework Japanese society and polity
so that Japan could stand on its own again as a power dedicated to peace. They were not
interested in establishing a long-term United States commitment to guarantee Japan's external
security.
Joseph Nye argues that if there were no United States - Japan security alliance then
it would have to be created. [Ref. 149: p. 5] While the United States and Japan certainly
might find enough commmon ground to sign a 1996 security treaty, neither side would
currently agree to the basing of over 45,000 United States troops in Japan given the current
threat levels. Also a newly created security relationship would undoubtedly be a more
balanced agreement that would give Japan more responsibility for its own defense, and the
maintenance of regional security.
Both countries require more flexibility in dealing with other Asian countries than their
current bilateral relationship allows. In a multipolar world both Japan and the United States
must individually decide how to defend their interests as they are challenged. If Japan decides
that it prefers to use 'check-book diplomacy' rather than dispatching its troops in a given
situation then it should be left to do so — and to face the good or bad consequences of its
decision. Conversely, United States policymakers must remember that they have a duty to
choose their fights carefully. Being tied to commitiments that do not clearly affect vital
interests is a luxury that America can not afford. They also should remember that moral
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crusades to remake other countries into America's image do not excuse the immorality of
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APPENDIX A. TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER
Proclamation approved at Berlin (Potsdam) July 26, 1945
1945 For. Rel. (Conference of Berlin
(Potsdam), II) 1474
Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China
and the United Kingdom
(1) We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the
Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our
countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China,
many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west are poised to strike the fmal blows
upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations
to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free
peoples ofthe world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that
now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis,
necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The
full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete
destruction of the Japanese homeland.
(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-
willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the
threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall
brook no delay.
(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived
and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of
peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-
making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied
to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be
limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return
to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but
stem justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our
prisoners. The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as
well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
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(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit
the exaction ofjust reparations in kind, but not those industries which would enable her to re-arm for
war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual
Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives
have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of
the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
(13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the
Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action.
The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
Potsdam, July 26, 1945
Harry S. Truman
Winston Churchill




APPENDIX B. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951
Japan has this day signed a Treaty ofPeace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force
of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-
defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because
irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a
Security Treaty with the United States ofAmerica to come into force simultaneously with the
Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan. The Treaty of Peace
recognizes that Japan as a Sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security
arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations
possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.
In exercise ofthese rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that
the United States ofAmerica should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so
as to deter armed attack upon Japan.
The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing
to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that
Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and
indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or
serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the United Nations Charter.
Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:
Article I. Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the
coming into force of the Treaty ofPeace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air
and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the
maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of
Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of
the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan,
caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.
Article II. During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant,
without the prior consent ofthe United States of America, any bases or any rights, power, or
authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit
of ground, air, or naval forces to any third power.
Article III. The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the
United States ofAmerica in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements
between the two Governments.
Article IV. This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the
United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations
arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will
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satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international
peace and security in the Japan Area.
Article V. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will
come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at
Washington.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this
the eighth day of September, 1951.
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APPENDIX C. TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON,
D.C., JANUARY 19, 1960
The United States of America and Japan,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between
them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote
conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nation,
and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as
affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace
and security in the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,
Therefore agree as follows:
Article I. The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to
settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations.
The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the
United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be
discharged more effectively.
Article II. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a
better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by
promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their
international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.
Article HI. The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their
constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.
Article IV. The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of
Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
Article V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
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and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of
Article 51 ofthe Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article VI. For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance
of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted
the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.
The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of the United States armed forces
in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative Agreement
under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan,
signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangement as may
be agreed upon.
Article VII. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting any way
the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article VIII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date
on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.
Article IX. The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed
at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, shall expire upon the entering into force
of this Treaty.
Article X. This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the
United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations
arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Japan area.
However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to
the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall
terminate one year after such notice has been given.
EST witness WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally
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